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FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
by
Joseph W MCKnight*

I. STATUS

NFORMAL Marriage. Three elements are necessary for an informal marriage in Texas. The parties must (1) agree to be husband and
wife, (2) cohabit as such, and (3) hold each other out as husband and
wife.' A Texas federal district court adopted a strict construction of these
requirements in Conlon v. Schweiker. 2 This case was a child's suit for survivor's benefits in which the child claimed that she was the issue of a valid
informal marriage between her mother and the decedent. Although in an
earlier suit involving the mother, the child, and the decedent a Texas court
had found that a valid marriage had existed,3 the federal court was not
satisfied that the evidence supported that conclusion. The evidence of cohabitation was clear, but the court found that the mother's testimony that
the decedent was introduced to friends as "hers" was not enough evidence
of a holding out as husband and wife. 4 Although the court recognized that
Texas law allows circumstantial evidence of the agreement element to
prove the marriage, the court held that the mother's testimony that she and
the decedent had lived together for about two weeks, along with the other
evidence adduced, was not sufficient to raise an inference of an agreement
to be married. 5
Texas courts, like those of many other jurisdictions, have never recognized any right of support or compensation for household services performed by an unmarried cohabitant. 6 Property rights in such a relationship
arise from a contract between the parties or on the basis of the amount
each party contributed for the acquisition. 7 In a recent New Jersey case,
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of law, Southern Methodist University. The author acknowledges the
assistance of Paul R. Clevenger and Elizabeth Smith in preparation of this Article.
1. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(a)(2) (Vernon 1975); see Morris v. Morris, 403 S.W.2d
295, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ); Rosales v. Rosales, 377
S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1964, no writ).
2. 537 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
3. A domestic relations court in Dallas County found that a marriage had existed and
granted the petitioning woman a divorce. Id. at 160-61.
4. Id. at 164-65.
5. Id. at 164.
6. See Meador v. Ivy, 390 S.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1965, no
writ); Timmons v. Timmons, 222 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1949, no
writ).
7. See, e.g., Flaglie v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 557, 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978,
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however, the court held that when one unmarried cohabitant sues to enforce an alleged agreement between the parties, a temporary injunction
requiring the defendant to allow the claimant the use of the home until the
dispute is resolved may be proper. 8 The court emphasized that such an
injunction should issue only when necessary to prevent irreparable harm
and noted that in this case one cohabitant was threatened with the loss of a
place to live at a time when she was wholly without support. 9 A Texas
court might arrive at a similar conclusion concerning alleged cotenants.
During the 1983 regular session of the Texas Legislature, two bills dealing with informal marriage were defeated. One of the bills would have
increased the filing fee for informal marriage declarations and would have
required a portion of those fees, along with part of the marriage license
fees, to be allocated for the enforcement of child abuse laws.' 0 The other
proposal was designed to abolish informal marriage altogether by providing that persons could not marry in Texas without the acquisition of a
marriage license and the performance of a ceremony."I
Entering into Marriage. The Attorney General of Texas rendered several
opinions in 1983 concerning persons authorized to conduct marriage ceremonies. Section 1.83 of the Texas Family Code' 2 authorizes retired judges
and justices of the peace with at least fifteen aggregate years of service to
perform marriages. The attorney general construed this statute to allow
marriages if they continue to
persons with such years of service to perform
13
capacity.
nonjudicial
a
in
state
the
serve
In another opinion, the attorney general concluded that the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution forbids a justice of the
peace from refusing to perform interracial marriages.14 In a third opinion,
the attorney general stated that a judge of a court of record who receives a
full-time salary may receive a fee or donation for performing a marriage
ceremony, even if he conducts the ceremony during regular working
hours. 15 The attorney general reasoned that because judges are under no
duty to perform marriages and have no assigned working hours, they may16
perform marriages and receive fees for doing so whenever they wish.
These latter two opinions are inconsistent in that they accord differing
writ refd n.r.e.); Meador v. Ivy, 390 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, no
writ); Fort Worth & R.G. Ry. v. Robertson, 121 S.W. 202, 204-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1909),rev'd, 103 Tex. 504, 131 S.W. 400 (1910); see also 31 A.L.R.2D 1255, 1299-1307

(1953).
8. Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 447 A.2d 173 (1982).
9. Id. at 176. The court also required the defendant to pay the claimant's support
while the action was pending. Id. at 178.
10. Tex. H.B. 75, 68th Leg. (1983).
11. Tex. H.B. 937, 68th Leg. (1983).
12. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.83 (Vernon Supp. 1984).

13. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. MW-589 (1982).
14. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-I (1983), conforming with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1966).
15. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-22 (1983).
16. Id.
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levels of discretion to judges to decide whether or not to perform
marriages.
The inconsistency is of little moment, however, in light of the fact that
the Texas Legislature amended Family Code section 1.83 in 1983 to forbid
not only racial discrimination in performing marriage ceremonies but also
discrimination on the basis of religion or national origin.17 The amendment also prohibits discrimination by all state officials authorized to perform marriages, rather than merely justices of the peace.18 The legislature
also enacted the Venereal Disease Control Act, 19 which repealed provisions of the Family Code that required premarital blood tests for
syphilis. 20 The drafters of the Family Code
had considered such action in
2
1968 but rejected it on medical advice. '
InterspousalTestimony. An alleged spouse by informal marriage is competent to testify against an accused in Texas if the accused offers no evidence
of the informal marriage at trial. 22 In a recent federal case in California 23 a
woman who was a party to an informal union sought to invoke the marital
privilege in order to avoid having to testify against her companion in a
grand jury proceeding. The court, however, refused to allow a privilege to
be invoked in a grand jury proceeding by a party to an informal relationship that is not there recognized as a marriage. 24 In so holding, the court
emphasized that privileges must be narrowly construed in the context of
grand jury proceedings because of the strong public interest in discovering
25
criminal evidence.
A proposed amendment to article 38.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure 26 was introduced in the legislature in 1983.27 The amendment
was designed to allow prosecutors to compel a person to testify against his
spouse when the spouse is accused of certain serious crimes 28 or when the
17.

Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 437, § C, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2798, 2799 (codified at TEX.

§ 1.83(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984)). No effort was made to allow marriage
between persons of the same sex. See Murphy v. State, 653 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. App.FAM. CODE ANN.

San Antonio 1983, pet. refd).
18. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §

1.83(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
19. Texas Venereal Disease Control Act, ch. 493, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2889 (codified at
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4445d (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
20. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.25 (Vernon 1975) (formerly required applicants for marriage licenses to undergo seriologic tests for syphillis. This section and id. §§ 121-138 were
repealed by the Texas Venereal Disease Control Act.
21. McKnight, Title 1, Husband and Wife, Texas Family Law Symposium, 5 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 281, 290 (1974).
22. Salayandia v. State, 651 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, pet.

ref'd).
23. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Witness Ms. X, 562 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Cal. 1983).

24. Id. at 488.
25. Id. at 487-88. For a general critique of the federal law on interspousal immunity,
see Lempert, A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 27 L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Apr.-June
1983, at 26-33.
26. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1979).
27. Tex. H.B. 71, 68th Leg. (1983).

28. Id. The spouse may be compelled to testify against his or her spouse when the
spouse is accused of violating TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19, 21, or 22 (Vernon 1974 &
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victim of the crime is a child of either spouse under sixteen years of age. 29
The proposed legislation was defeated, however, and the current version of
article 38.11, which allows only voluntary testimony by one spouse against
30
the other under limited conditions, remains in effect.
InterspousalImmunity. In Flynn v. Flynn 3' a federal district court in Ohio
addressed the question of whether one spouse may be held liable in damages for at-home illegal wiretapping of telephone conversations between
the other spouse and a third person. Holding that a spouse may indeed be
liable for such activity, 32 the court reached a different result from that of
the Fifth Circuit in Simpson v. Simpson,33 a case from Alabama. In Simpson the Fifth Circuit held that spouses could not sue each other for illegal
wiretapping because Congress, when it enacted the federal wiretapping
statute,34 did not intend to override the doctrine of interspousal immunity.35 In Flynn the court disagreed with this reasoning, observing that a
number of states have abandoned the interspousal immunity doctrine and
that this federal statute expressly created the cause of action for illegal
36
wiretapping.
Recoveryfor Loss of Consortium and Wrongful Death. Within three years
both a federal district court37 and a Texas appellate court 38 have held that
a right of recovery exists for loss of consortium under the Texas Wrongful
Death Act39 for injury of a spouse by a third person. Further, in Soriano v.
Medina40 the San Antonio court of appeals held that a husband could recover damages for mental anguish resulting from the loss of his wife in an
Supp. 1984). The specific crimes included are murder, manslaughter, criminally negligent
homicide, incest, and any other sex- or assault-related offense.
29. Tex. H.B. 71, 68th Leg. (1983).
30. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1979) provides in part:
However, a wife or husband may voluntarily testify against each other in any
case for an offense involving any grade of assault or violence committed by
one against the other or against any child of either under 16 years of age, or in
any case where either is charged with incest of a child of either, or in any case
where either is charged with bigamy, or in any case where either is charged
with interference with child custody, or in any case where either is charged
with nonsupport of his or her spouse or minor child.
31. 560 F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
32. Id. at 924-25.
33. 490 F.2d 803, 808-09 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
34. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(1982).
35. 490 F.2d at 808-09.
36. 560 F. Supp. at 924. The court noted that "[t]here is also substantial doubt whether
a doctrine of state tort law should have any influence in defining a cause of action expressly
created by federal statute, particularly when Congress could have included a similar provision in the statute and failed to do so." Id. For an analysis of interspousal tort liability, see
Note, Interspousal Tort Immunity, 6 TEX. S.U.L. REV. 419 (1981).
37. Stanford v. McLean Trucking Co., 506 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
38. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Dawson, 662 S.W.2d 740, 742-43 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1983, no writ).
39. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-4678 (Vernon 1952 & Pam. Supp. 1941-1983).
40. 648 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
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automobile accident involving both spouses. 4 1 Rather than allowing recovery under the Wrongful Death Act, the court emphasized that the claim
for mental suffering was part of the plaintiffs own injuries and thus was
recoverable in addition to his claims under the Wrongful Death Act. 4 2 A
federal court sitting in Illinois, however, held that the right to consortium
is not an interest protected by the Constitution or federal law, but is merely
a right under state tort law. 43 In this case a wife claimed that her husband's arrest resulted in loss of consortium and thus gave rise to a section
1983 civil action against the police department for deprivation of her
rights. 44 The court denied this claim, holding that consortium is not an
interest protected by45the Constitution or federal law, but is merely a matter
for state regulation.
In an appeal from the Southern District of Texas4 6 the Fifth Circuit
addressed the question of whether the Death on the High Seas Act 4 7 gives
the surviving spouse of a seaman a cause of action for wrongful death
based on unseaworthiness 48 when the decedent has previously settled his
injury claim. In holding that the spouse has such a cause of action, the
court stated that the Act was designed to provide for persons who are left
without financial support as a result of a seaman's death.49 The seaman's
claim against his employer for his injuries and his spouse's claim for
wrongful death are, therefore, distinct causes of action. 50 Hence a recovery for an injury action does not bar a spouse's later recovery for wrongful
death.
Grounds/or Divorce. In Trickey v. Trickey5 ' the wife argued that a divorce
41. Id. at 429.
42. Id. at 430.
43. Walters v. Village of Oak Lawn, 548 F. Supp. 417, 419 (N.D. I11.1982).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 1983, on which the wife in Walters relied, provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
45. 548 F. Supp. at 419.
46. Bodden v. American Offshore, Inc., 681 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1982).
47. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976).
48. 681 F.2d at 331-32.
49. Id. at 331. The Death on the High Seas Act provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of
any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of
the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a
suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for
the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been
liable if death had not ensued.
46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
50. 681 F.2d at 332-33.
51. 642 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ dism'd).
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court lacked jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage "performed in a church
under the Holy Bible" except on Biblical grounds. The Fort Worth court
of appeals responded in kind: "[S]uch a law . . . would constitute cruel
of the spouses, in effect, in
and unusual punishment and actually place5 one
2
a prison from which there was no parole".
II.

CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY

Deed Recitals. Although property acquired during marriage is presumed
to be community property,5 3 this presumption may be overcome when the
property is acquired with the separate property of a spouse.5 4 In the case
of realty a deed recital to that effect is a useful element of proof of that
fact.5 5 In Little v. Linder56 a husband was an active participant in a
purchase of land that was conveyed to the wife as her separate property,
and the deed recited that the consideration was paid with the wife's separate estate. In concluding that the land was the wife's separate property,
the Tyler court of appeals stated that when a deed contains such a recital
the property will be treated as the separate property of the wife.57 This
rule applies even when the consideration is actually community property
or the husband's separate estate and even if the husband denies that he
intended to make a gift to the wife.5 8 This outcome is an effect of the parol
evidence rule as enunciated in Lindsay v. Clayman.59 In Little the court
further stated that when a husband is a party to a purchase for the purported separate interest of the wife, the court generally will presume the
recitals in the deed to be true, whether or not the husband's name appears
in the purchase documents. 60 The court also held that when a wife and
husband purport to make a joint conveyance of the wife's separate property to a third person and reserve a mineral interest in the grantors, coownership of the mineral interest does not result, because the husband had
no interest and thus cannot reserve an interest in the property. 6 1 The purported reservation in favor of the husband is merely an attempted reservation for a third party to the transaction, which under Texas law is
62
inoperative.
52. Id. at 50.

53. Brownlee v. Brownlee, 573 S.W.2d 878, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no
writ); Poulter v. Poulter, 565 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
54. The burden is on the party asserting that the property is separate, and such party
must overcome the community presumption by "clear and satisfactory evidence." Poulter v.
Poulter, 565 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
55. United States & Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Milk Producers Ass'n, 383 S.W.2d 181, 183
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. 651 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
57. Id. at 900.
58. Id. at 898.
59. 151 Tex. 593, 596, 254 S.W.2d 777, 779-80 (1952).
60. 651 S.W.2d at 898.
61. Id. at 900;see Ryan v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank, 433 S.W.2d 2, 7-8 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1968, no writ), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24

Sw. L.J. 49, 51-52 (1970).
62. 651 S.W.2d at 900-01. In order for the husband to have any interest in the mineral
reservation, the wife would have had to convey such interest to him before conveying the
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Income From Trusts. In Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States 63 seven
trusts were created for the benefit of a wife during her marriage. Her parents created six of the trusts and her husband created the seventh. Under
each trust the wife was entitled to all the income for life, and on her death
the corpus of each trust was to pass to others. With but one exception, the
wife's interest in all the trusts was not subject to anticipation by her and
was immune from her creditors' claims. The trustee held significant undistributed income when the husband died, and the Internal Revenue Service
took the position that the undistributed income and the wife's investments
with distributed income should be treated as community property for purposes of taxing the husband's estate. The United States Court of Claims
analyzed the Texas 64 and the Fifth Circuit 65 cases on the subject. The
court concluded that the Texas cases treated the income from trusts as the
separate property of the beneficiary and that the Fifth Circuit cases had
misconstrued Texas law in concluding that trust income is community
property. Hence the court reasoned that neither undistributed income held
by the trustees on the death of the husband nor investments made by the
wife with trust income received should be included in the husband's estate
for estate tax purposes. 66 Thus the income from the trust was the true
67
subject matter of the gifts in trust from the settlors to the wife.
Separate Corporate Interest. In 1982 the Texas Supreme Court said by
way of obiter dicta in Vallone v. Vallone 68 that the appreciation in value of
separate stock in a closely held corporation is separate property 69 and that
the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for the uncompensated labor
of the owner spouse that has caused the appreciation. 70 In Jensen v. Jensen 71 a very similar case was before the court. Shortly before his marriage,
land to a third party. See Canter v. Lindsey, 575 S.W.2d 331, 334-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63. 221 Ct. Cl. 686, 510 F.2d 703 (1983).
64. Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d 843, 846-47 (Tex. 1965); Martin Brown Co. v. Perfill, 77 Tex. 199, 204, 13 S.W. 975, 976-77 (1890); Hutchison v. Mitchell, 39 Tex. 487, 492-93
(1883); In re Long, 542 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ); Buckler
v. Buckler, 424 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ dism'd); Mercantile
Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 279 S.W.2d 650, 653-54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350, 357-58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ refd);
Shepflin v. Small, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 493, 495-96, 23 S.W. 432, 432-33 (1893, no writ).
65. Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Wilson,
76 F.2d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 1935).
66. 610 F.2d at 711-15.
67. See McKnight, Family Law Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31

Sw. L.J. 105, 112-13 (1977). Even assuming that trust income is community property, the
court in Cluck v. Cluck, 647 S.W.2d 338, 340-41 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ
dism'd), held that neither spouse had standing to object to its division in favor of the other
spouse because some third person's right might thereby be infringed.
68. 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982); see Ray, Comments on Cameron and Vallone, ST. B.
SEC. REP., FAM. L., Winter 1982, at 6; Comment, Closely Held Corporationsin the Wake of
Vallone: Enhancement of Stock Value by Community Time, Talent andLabor, 35 BAYLOR L.
REv. 47 (1983).

69. 644 S.W.2d at 558.
70. Id. at 489. The plaintiff, however, had not pled a claim for reimbursement.
71. 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
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the husband in Jensen purchased a majority of the stock in a closely held
corporation. During the marriage, he expended approximately ninety percent of his time running the business, and as a result the value of the stock
greatly increased. The trial court ruled that the community was not entitled to receive the value of the appreciation in the shares, because the community had been adequately compensated by the salary and dividends the
husband had received from the corporation. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the enhanced value of the stock was itself community
property because it resulted from the time and labor of the husband. 72
The supreme court first affirmed the court of appeals holding in Jensen, 7 3 but on motion for rehearing the court reversed, affirming the judgment of the trial court.7 4 On a second motion for rehearing the court
remanded the case for determination of the amount of reimbursement owing, if any. 75 In order to arrive at the amount to which the community is
entitled the trial court must find the value of the labor expended and subtract "salary, bonus, dividends and other fringe benefits" as well as the
value of efforts "reasonably necessary to manage and preserve the separate
estate." '76 It is striking that the court directed deduction of the stockholder-employee's dividends, which are community profit from his separate property, but did not include the value of the corporation's retained
earnings in its formula. But this formulation is perhaps understandable if
72. Jensen v. Jensen, 629 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983), rev'd, 665 S.W.2d
107 (Tex. 1984). For a discussion of the intermediate appellate court's opinion, see McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 65, 69
(1983).
73. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 480 (July 6, 1983). For an historical analysis of the antecedents
of this rule, see Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 458-60 (Tex. 1982). The Vallone case
also involved the question of whether the community has an interest in the increase in value
of a spouse's separately owned stock resulting from the expenditure of community time and
labor. Although the majority in Vallone limited its discussion to procedural grounds, Justice
Sondock's dissent directly addressed the increased-stock-value issue. Justice Sondock concluded that the increase in value of the stock must belong to the community estate. 644
S.W.2d at 460-63. For a discussion of Justice Sondock's dissent in Vallone, see McKnight,
supra note 72, at 68-69.
74. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 68, 70 (Nov. 9,1983), discussedin Note, The Community's Interest
in Separate CorporateStock: Jensen v. Jensen, 37 Sw. L.J. 1203 (1984).
75. 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984). The supreme court concluded that the trial court's
finding was based on testimony relating to the husband's stock ownership rather than the
value of labor expended and was therefore "without adequate support." Id. at 110. Although this formulation may be difficult to square with the stricture of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 1728 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (prohibiting supreme court from reversing on basis of
insufficient evidence, a fact question, but permitting reversal based on "no evidence", a
question of law), it seems unlikely that the court meant to depart from its previous interpretation of that standard. Thus, it appears the court decided Jensen on the ground that no
evidence supported the trial court's finding.
A concurring justice in Jensen observed that the majority's remand evidenced the court's
withdrawal from the rule announced in Vallone that a claimant must plead the right of
reimbursement in order to assert it. 665 S.W.2d at 110-11 (Robertson, J., concurring). The
court's handling of Jensen is better viewed, however, as an instance of trial by consent with
respect to the reimbursement issue, as demonstrated by the evidence at trial and the trial
court's findings. It seems very unlikely, moreover, that the court intended to depart from the
rule of pleading announced in Vallone.
76. 665 S.W.2d at 110. The burden of establishing reimbursement is on the claimant.
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it is assumed that the employee's labor will be valued in light of the success
of the business, which must be measured to some degree by the amount of
its retained earnings. Enhancement of the shares is irrelevant to the computation, but it is apparent that in the outcome of the division on divorce
the other shareholders enjoy enhancement of their shares at the expense of
the shareholder whose efforts produced the enhancement.
The court added that, if on remand a "right to reimbursement is proved,
a lien shall not attach to Mr. Jensen's separate property shares. Rather, a
money judgment may be awarded. '77 Thus, the court seemed to reject as
meaningless the customary practice of fixing a lien or charge on corporate
shares or other personalty awarded to one party for the purpose of securing the payment of a money judgment to the other party. 78 But if the
claimant of reimbursement should have seized the shares as a means of
securing payment of a money judgment, it would seem that the divorce
court might not be precluded from fashioning appropriate prospective relief in the case of nonpayment of the judgment. The court in Jensen did
not appear to deny divorce courts the power of fixing a lien on realty when
necessary to give security for payment of a money judgment for improvements made on the realty.
Business Goodwill. In Finn v. Finn79 the court considered the character of a
member's interest in a legal partnership. During twenty years of marriage,
the husband had worked for and had become a partner in a large law firm.
The partnership agreement, which contained a formula for determining
the value of a partner's interest in case of death or withdrawal from the
firm, denied compensation for accrued goodwill. In light of this provision
the Dallas court of appeals held that it was proper for the trial court to
instruct the jury not to consider the law firm's goodwill or future earning
capacity when placing a value on the community interest in the husband's
law practice. 80 The court distinguished an earlier case 8 ' in which the structure of the corporation was such that the goodwill enhanced the value of
the community interest and was thus subject to division upon divorce.
Case law has defined a two-part test for determining whether the goodwill of a professional practice is subject to division. 82 First, the goodwill
must exist independently of the personal skills of the professional spouse.
77. Id.

78. The court's earlier allusion to "proving a charge upon the shares," id., is apparently
a mere figure of speech. The court apparently treated placing a lien on the shares as meaningless because it offers no appropriate means of enforcement. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 8.317 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984); TEX. R. Civ. P. 641.
79. 658 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
80. Id. at 742.
81. Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ
dism'd). In Geesbreght the court held that the corporation's goodwill existed apart from the
personal ability of the husband. This corporate goodwill had a commercial value; hence to
the extent that goodwill enhanced the value of the community stock, it was subject to division upon divorce. Id. at 436.
82. 658 S.W.2d at 740-41 (citing Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972); Geesbreght v.
Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ dism'd)).
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Second, the court must determine whether the goodwill has a commercial
value in which the community estate is entitled to share. In Finn the court
indicated that the husband's law firm had goodwill independent of the
husband's professional ability, since a large part of the firm's reputation
had risen from the professional abilities of both the husband's predecessors
in the firm and his present partners and professional employees.8 3 Furthermore, the court held the goodwill of a long established firm has commercial value.8 4 The court in this instance reasoned, however, that the
community estate was not entitled to a greater interest than that to which
the husband was entitled.8 5 Since the partnership agreement did not provide a means of realizing the value of goodwill directly, the only means by
which the husband might realize such value was through continuing to
practice law as a member of the firm. This inability to realize the value of
the firm's goodwill convinced
the court that the goodwill of the firm was
86
not community property.
Retirement Benefits. On June 26, 1981, the United States Supreme Court
concluded in McCarty v. McCarty8 7 that nondisability military retirement
benefits were not community property for purposes of division on divorce.8 8 In 1982 the President signed the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act,8 9 by which Congress apparently intended to nullify the effect of the McCarty decision. Texas appellate courts have since
been very concerned about the mutual effects of McCarty and the Act,
particularly with respect to final divorce decrees in which military retirement benefits were divided as community property prior to the decision in
McCarty.9 In Segrest v. Segrest 9 1 the Texas Supreme Court held that the
83. 658 S.W.2d at 741.
84. Id.

85. Id. at 740-41.
86. Id. The court was careful to point out, however, that while goodwill and future
earning capacity do not affect the value on the community interest in a spouse's law practice,
the court may consider the extent to which the spouse's earning potential is enhanced by his
continued participation in the law firm when assessing any disparity in earning capacity of
the spouses. Id. at 742; see also Cluck v. Cluck, 647 S.W.2d 338, 343 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1982, writ dism'd) (upholding disparate community division due to husband's retention of his entire professional practice). The result in Finn is consistent with the holding
in In re Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979). For a discussion of earlier
Texas cases on business goodwill, see McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wfe, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 99, 111-12 (1979). See also Crutchfield, ProfessionalDegrees and Spousal Rights, 88 CASE & COMMENT, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 14; Raggio, Professional
Goodwill and Professional Licenses as Property Subject to Distribution Upon Dissolution of
Marriage, 16 FAM. L.Q. 147 (1982); Udinsky, Goodwill Depreciation. A New Method for
Valuing Professional Practices in Marital Dissolution, 9 COMM. PROP. J. 307 (1982).

87. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
88. Id. at 232-36.
89. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982). For an analysis of the Act, see Reppy, Reconsidering the
Rules for Military Benefits, 5 FAM. ADvoc., Spring 1983, at 30. See also Segrest v. Segrest,

649 S.W.2d 610, 613 n.2 (Tex. 1983).
90. Compare Exparte Acree, 623 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ)
(giving retroactive application to McCarty), with Exparte Guadion, 628 S.W.2d 500, 502-03
(Tex. App.-Austin 1982, no writ) (refusing to give McCarty retroactive application).
91. 649 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 242, 78 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1983).
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McCarty rule is inapplicable to divorce decrees that were final prior to the
announcement of that decision. 92 In Segrest the ex-husband sought a declaratory judgment that a 1974 divorce decree dividing military retirement
pay was unenforceable. The trial court ruled in his favor, and the court of
appeals affirmed. 93 The supreme court in Segrest rejected the husband's
contention on two grounds. First, the court held that the McCarty decision
was not intended to be retroactive 94 and thus was inapplicable to divorce
decrees that were final before McCarty was decided. 95 The court reasoned
that any retroactive application would place an inequitable burden upon
former spouses for whom divisions of the community estate were based
upon the assumption that military retirement benefits constituted community assets. 96 Second, the court determined that the prior divorce decree
that the
should be viewed as being merely erroneous rather than void, and
97
aside.
set
be
not
could
judgment
valid
and
unappealed,
final,
The Texas Supreme Court also considered apportionment of the value
of a pensioner's retirement benefits when a couple is divorced prior to the
pensioner-spouse's retirement. In Berry v. Berry98 a couple was divorced
after twenty-six years of marriage, during which time the husband had
worked for a particular company and had accumulated rights toward retirement. When the husband retired twelve years after the divorce, the
wife brought a partition suit to recover her share of the retirement benefits,
which the divorce decree had not divided. The supreme court held that
the benefits in such a case had to be apportioned to the spouses on the
basis of the value of the community interest in the pension upon divorce. 9 9
The ex-wife, therefore, was entitled to one half of the amount that the
husband would have received had he retired at the date of divorce. 100 The
92. 649 S.W.2d at 612-13. For a discussion of cases in which the divorce decree was not
final at the time of the McCarty decision and the proper characterization of retirement bene-

fits in such cases, see infra notes 274-306 and accompanying text.
93. 649 S.W.2d at 611. The court of appeals decision is unpublished. Id. n.1.
94. Id. at 612. The court cited a three-element test promulgated in Chevron v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97, 105-08 (197 1), for determining whether and to what extent a judicially modified
or abrogated rule of law should be given retroactive operation. In Segrest the court stated

that this test inquires "(1) Whether the holding in question 'decid[ed] an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed' by earlier cases; (2) 'whether retrospective operation will further or retard [the] operation' of the holding in question; and

(3) whether retroactive application 'could produce substantial inequitable results' in individual cases." 649 S.W.2d at 612 (quoting Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07).

95. 649 S.W.2d at 613.
96. Id.

It should be noted that art. 5783, § 10 of the Texas statutes, which provides

death and disability payments to members of Texas military forces, has been amended to

increase the amount of both death and disability payments. Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 104,
1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 508 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5783, § 10 (Vernon
Supp. 1984)).
97. 649 S.W.2d at 613.
98. 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983).
99. Id. at 947.
100. Id. at 946-47. In this case the husband actually would not have been entitled to any
benefits had he retired at the date of divorce, because the company only paid benefits to
those retiring after reaching age 60. The court, however, determined the amount of benefits
at the date of divorce by calculating the amount the husband would have received had he
been 60 years old at the time of divorce. Id. at 945-46.
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Texas Supreme Court rejected the division the court of appeals had made
of the benefits, which would have awarded the wife half of 26/38 of the
benefits, based on the ratio of the length of time the couple was married to
the number of years the husband was employed. 10 Such an award, the
supreme court stated, would invade the separate property of the husband,
because it would allow the wife to share in benefits earned by the husband
after the divorce as well as increased benefits produced by subsequent
union contract agreements, which had no relation to rights accrued during
marriage.' 0 2 Unfortunately, however, the court failed to comment on
whether the wife should share in post-divorce pension adjustments for
mere cost of living increases. Although such increases are arguably in the
nature of post-divorce gifts and hence the pensioner's separate property,
federal law 10 3 provides the employer tax incentives for making such adjustments, which serve, moreover, to establish the employer's goodwill in
the eyes of present employees. Thus, pension adjustments representing
cost of living increases should not be treated as gifts to the employee, and,
therefore, it would seem that they should be reflected in the entitlement of
the employee's former spouse. Further, if pension benefits are fully matured before divorce and cost-of-living increments are added to them, and
nothing more, the rule in Berry seems inapplicable because the pensioner
has acquired no new interest as a result of his labor following divorce. In
the alternative, it would seem that in a post-divorce partition situation the
pensioner's former spouse should be entitled to interest on the amount of
her unpaid entitlement dating from receipt of the benefits by the pensioner. The opinion in Berry, however, does not address either alternative.
Those points aside, the courts and counsel will nevertheless have practical
difficulty in giving effect to Berry in many instances. In particular, testimony as to the value of the benefits that the pensioner will receive when he
retires will be necessary so that the judgment entered at the time of divorce
will not require future clarification. Courts and practitioners will also encounter difficulty in structuring formulae of division that will comply with
the Berry doctrine in the context of economic realities. The Austin court
of appeals has twice wrestled with the holding in Berry in the context of
federal civil service retirement benefits earned, in one case, before, during,
and after the termination of a marriage, °4 and in the other, 10 5 merely during marriage and following divorce. Both cases exemplify the problems
inherent in applying the Berry rule.
101. Berry v. Berry, 636 S.W.2d 865, 866-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1982), rev'd, 647
S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983).
102. 647 S.W.2d at 946-47. The court noted that during the husband's 12 additional

years of work after the divorce, he received numerous pay raises which resulted in increases

to his retirement benefits. Id. For a pre-Berry, pre-McCarty divorce division case anticipating the results in Berry, see Moore v. Jones, 640 S.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1982, no writ).
103. Employee Retirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
104. Heisterberg v. Standridge, 656 S.W.2d 138, 142-43 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no
writ).
105. Boniface v. Boniface, 656 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
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III.

MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY

Joint Tenancy. McCarver v. Trumble 106 involved an attempt on the part of
foreign domiciliaries to create a joint tenancy in Texas land. Using two
equal checks drawn on their respective bank accounts, domiciliaries of
Colorado, a noncommunity property state, bought a tract of Texas land
and took title as a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship. After the
husband's death a dispute arose with respect to title to the property.
Claimants on behalf of the husband asserted that the property was presumptively community. 10 7 The widow, however, demonstrated that the

checks used in making the cash purchase
each spouse under Colorado law. Thus the
ancy was not subject to the line of Texas
of a joint tenancy with
ported acquisition
08
ineffective.'

were the separate property of
acquisition of title in joint tenauthority holding that a purTexas community property is

After-Acquired Property. A case in the Waco court of appeals' 0 9 presented
issues of considerable difficulty. A couple purchased the land at issue as
their community property in the 1950s. Title was apparently taken in the
names of both spouses, but the court did not treat the formal state of the
title as relevant. In 1965, in anticipation of divorce, the wife conveyed the
property to a third person with a covenant of warranty to satisfy the payment of a loan and with an intent to defraud her husband of his interest in
the land under the Texas fraudulent conveyance statute. I0 Although the
couple was then domiciled in Iowa, Texas law gave the husband management of the community estate."I The court in the couple's subsequent
divorce did not dispose of the property, and so it became a tenancy in
common of the former spouses by operation of law." 12 The grantee therefore asserted that the former wife's portion of the land passed by operation
of the after-acquired title doctrine.
The former husband argued that the wife's conveyance was void as a
fraud on him and that the wife's warranty was also void. On the fraud
point the court of appeals sustained the husband's argument under Texas
106. 660 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
107. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975) provides that "[piroperty possessed by
either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property."
108. 660 S.W.2d at 598. The Texas cases striking down attempt acquisitions of joint
tenancies with Texas community property include Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 693-95
(Tex. 1981); Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161
Tex. 569, 575-77, 342 S.W.2d 565, 569-70 (1961).
109. Pascoe v. Keuhnast, 642 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, no writ), appeal dismissed, 103 S.Ct. 3528, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1381 (1983).
110. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 3996 (1925), repealedby Act of Sept. I, 1967, ch. 785, § 1,
1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2343, reenacted as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 (Vernon
1968).
111. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4619 (1925), repealedby Act of Jan. 1,1968, ch. 309, § 1,
1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 735, 738, reenacted as TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
112. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

law.1 3 But even a void conveyance with a valid warranty would support
the operation of the after-acquired title doctrine, and it is on this point that
the court's reasoning in favor of the former husband foundered. The court
relied on a Texas Supreme Court decision 1 4 of 1893 for the proposition
that a married woman's warranty has no effect because of her lack of contractual capacity resulting from disabilities of coverture, but such reliance
was misplaced. What the court seemed to overlook was that those disabilities were removed by statute in 1963.'15 Hence it would seem that the
wife's one-half interest in the property passed to the grantee. If so, the
same result would obtain if during marriage either spouse purported to
dispose of jointly managed community property or property subject to the
sole management of the other spouse and the grantor later acquired part or
all of that property as his separate estate.
After-acquired property may also be the subject of a contractual will. In
Perl v. Howell 16 the husband and his first wife made contractual wills by
which all property of the first to die would pass to the survivor and on the
death of the survivor all property of the survivor would pass to their children. After his first wife's death, the husband remarried and made a new
will with different dispositive provisions. After the father's death the children of the first marriage fixed a constructive trust on the takers of the
second will to carry out the first will's provisions. The decedent's share of
the children of the first
the second community estate therefore passed to
7
marriage by the terms of the contractual will.'
Post Mortem Liability. The Family Code" I8 provides for the liability of
jointly managed community property' 19 of living spouses, while the Probate Code 120 deals with such liability when a debtor dies. Neither Code,
however, specifically addresses the situation when the debtor spouse survives the nondebtor spouse. In Carlton v. Estate of Estes 12 1 the Texas
Supreme Court recently rendered a per curiam opinion in such a case, but
22
some of the facts must be gleaned from the opinion of the court below. 1
During marriage, a judgment was rendered against the husband in a suit to
which the wife was not a party and the judgment was abstracted in the
county where community realty was located. After the wife's death the
113. 642 S.W.2d at 40 (citing Biccochi v. Casey-Swasey Co., 91 Tex. 259, 42 S.W. 963
(Tex. 1897)); see STATE BAR OF TEXAS, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS 356 (1963).

114. Wadkins v. Watson, 86 Tex. 194, 197, 24 S.W. 385, 385-86 (1893).
115. Act of June 10, 1963, ch. 472, § 4, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 1188. The consequences of
this act are codified as TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03 (Vernon 1975).

116. 650 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
117. Id. at 525.
118. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1975).
119. When recovery is sought against jointly managed community property, it is immaterial whether the liability stems from tortious or nontortious conduct. Id.
120. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 156 (Vernon 1980). For a discussion of § 156, see McKnight, MatrimonialProperty,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31, 44-45 (1972).

121. 664 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1983).
122. Carlton v. Estate of Estes, 654 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983), rev'd, 664
S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1983).
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judgment creditor filed his claim against the wife's estate in an attempt to
satisfy his judgment against the realty, which was in both spouses' names
and subject to inter vivos joint management. The wife's executor apparently did not assert the marshalling provisions of section 5.62 of the Family Code. 123 The executor apparently argued that the property was not
subject to liability because the wife was not a party to the suit. The execubefore both the probate court and the Fort Worth court of
tor succeeded
24
appeals. 1
Section 5.61(c) of the Family Code, provides: "The community property subject to a spouse's sole or joint management, control, and disposition is subject to the liabilities incurred by him or her before or during
marriage."'' 25 Because the creditor in Carlton had abstracted his judgment
in the county where the realty was located, the only serious question was
whether section 5.61(c) should be read literally. In effect, the court answered in the affirmative, holding that the jointly managed community
property was liable for the husband's judgment debt. 12 6 The court might
have raised two other points. First, it might have been argued that because
the wife was not a party to the suit against her husband, her executor
should have been able to employ the marshalling statute 127 so that liability
would fall first on the husband's separate property, then on the community
property subject to his sole management, and only thereafter on the judgment creditor's share of the formerly jointly managed community.
Second, some lawyers have wondered whether a levy of execution or
similar remedy is proper with respect to property in both spouses' names
when the judgment is in the name of only one spouse. 128 A literal reading
of section 5.61(c) seems to dispose of this argument. Ultimately it would
make no difference whether the wife were living or dead when foreclosure
of the lien was sought, as long as she was living when the judgment was
abstracted. In contrast, in a case in which the creditor has not acquired his
lien during the marriage by filing an abstract of judgment or otherwise,
and the non-debtor spouse has died, dissolution of the marriage causes a
partition of the community estate so that a community tract becomes undi129
vided shares of separate property. Section 156 of the Probate Code
clearly applies only in an instance when the debtor spouse dies first, and
section 5.61 (c) of the Family Code' 30 only concerns liability with respect to
community property. The result is that a creditor who waits until the
123. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.62 (Vernon 1975).
124. 654 S.W.2d 36, 37 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983), rev'd, 664 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.
1983).
125. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(c) (Vernon 1975).

126. 664 S.W.2d at 323.
127. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.62 (Vernon 1975).

128. See McKnight, supra note 86, at 148; McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 78-79 (1974); McKnight & Dorsaneo, Management andLiability
of Community Property and the Joinder of Spouses in Suits in Texas Family Law and Procedure-Advanced Famiy Law Refresher Course F 11-F 12 (State Bar of Texas 1976).
129. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 156 (Vernon 1980).
130. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(c) (Vernon 1975).
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debtor spouse dies before attempting to enforce his judgment loses his opportunity to enforce his lien against the non-debtor spouse's interest in the
3
former community estate.' '
Thus in the context of liability, as opposed to that of joint management, 32 the doctrine of virtual representation has not been abandoned in
Texas. Indeed, the language of section 5.61 clearly ordains the employment of this doctrine in certain circumstances. Hence, the nonobligated
spouse should seek the protection of section 5.62 to avoid the immediate
consequences of section 5.61. But whether or not section 5.62 is utilized,
on termination of the marriage the nonobligated spouse may still assert a
right of reimbursement for his or her share of community funds used to
discharge any liability that the obligated spouse would more properly have
borne alone.
It is fundamental, however, that if the sole manager of community property is properly deprived of that property, the other spouse's interest is lost
as well.'

33

Further if one spouse wishes to buy property that will perforce

be that spouse's solely managed community, that spouse acting alone may
fix a valid lien on such property to secure a loan for the purchase money.
At this date it is startling that a contrary view might be entertained. 134
Homestead- Designation and Extent. The Texas Constitution of 1876 defined the urban homestead in terms of the value of an urban lot or lots and
the rural homestead in terms of acreage. 35 The five thousand dollar
amount, without improvement, by which the urban homestead was defined 136 amply covered the combined value of residential and business realty in the late nineteenth century. After the 1950s, however, fewer and
fewer urban residential lots were available for five thousand dollars or less.
Thus in 1970 the constitution was amended to increase the urban home131. Thus, a creditor's right of enforcement of an unsecured debt against part of the
community may be precluded by death just as by divorce. See Miller v. City Nat'l Bank,
594 S.W.2d 823, 825-26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ). But the mere filing of a suit
for divorce does not affect the right of secured or unsecured creditors, nor does the appointment of a receiver by a divorce court interfere with a creditor's rights. See Mussina v. Morton, 657 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ). For the
consequences of bankruptcy following divorce, the authorities are collected in Comment,
Bankruptcy After Divorce. Rights and Liabilitiesof FormerSpouses in Texas, 23 S. TEX. L.J.
173 (1982).
132. See Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974). In Carr v.
Galvan, 650 S.W.2d 864, 869-70 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the San
Antonio appellate court was called upon to reverse an adjudication in which only the husband was involved for a deceptive trade practices claim relating to the wife's separate
property.
133. Flynn v. Savings & Profit Sharing Plan, 558 F. Supp. 861, 866-67 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
134. But see McKenzie v. U.S. Home Corp., 704 F.2d 778, 779 (5th Cir. 1983).
135. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876, amended 1970). For the early history of the
development of Texas homestead law, see McKnight, Protection of the Family Home from
Seizure by Creditors.-The Sources and Evaluation of a Legal Principle, 86 Sw. HIST. Q. 369
(1983).
136. Law of Apr. 26, 1897, ch. 101, § 1, 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 131, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS
OF TEXAS

1185 (1898).
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stead exemption to ten thousand dollars.137 Within a decade, price inflation had again overtaken the value. It therefore seemed wise to redefine
the urban homestead in terms of either value or area, at the claimant's
choice, or else to define it in terms of area alone. The new definition,
which was ultimately proposed 38 and adopted in the general election of
1983,139 speaks in terms of area alone and expressly applies to homesteads
previously established.140 It must be pointed out, however, that although
an urban homestead claimant may assert the amendment's applicability to
a homestead previously defined in terms of value, the new definition nevertheless does not seem to apply with respect to debts the homestead owner
incurred prior to the effective date of the amendment. 141 The consequence
of the new amendment, which defines the urban homestead as consisting
of "not more than one acre of land, together with any improvements on
the land,"' 42 is that the urban homestead may again effectively cover "a
home, or . . . a place to exercise the calling or business of the homestead
claimant .... ",143
In Steenland v. Texas Commerce Bank National Assn 144 the court considered the rights of a debtor when his creditor attempts to satisfy a judgment from that part of a tract in excess of the portion that is exempt as an
urban homestead according to the former definition in terms of value. The
creditor bank in Steenland obtained a judgment against a debtor and requested an order authorizing the forced sale of the debtor's homestead and
the appointment of a receiver. The bank argued that pursuant to article
3827a 145 the court had jurisdiction to determine the extent of the debtor's
exemption in his property and to appoint a receiver. The debtor opposed
137. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876, amended 1970).
138. Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 68th Leg., 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 6724-25.
139. Id. The election was held on Nov. 8, 1983. The effective date of the amendment
was Nov. 29, 1983. The general election concerning the amendment was authorized by and
conducted under TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
140. Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, § 2, 68th Leg., 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 6724.
141. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (prohibiting state laws impairing contract obligations);
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 599-602 (1877); Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610,
622-24 (1873); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L. REV. 512,
53947 (1944).
142. Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 68th Leg., 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 6724; TEX. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 50 (1876, amended 1973).
143. Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 68th Leg., 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 6274-75; TEX. CONST. art.
XVI, § 50 (1876, amended 1973). The legislature amended TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
3833(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) so that the urban homestead would be redefined when
and if the constitutional amendment proposed in Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105 was adopted. Act of
June 19, 1983, ch. 976, § 3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5309, 5309-10 (amending TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), now codified before amendment in TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Pam. 1983)). As under prior law the claimant will have
to establish the designation of the business homestead. See In re Sandlin, No. 583-0056, slip
op. at 1-6 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1983).
144. 648 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
145. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3827a (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides in part:
(a) A judgment creditor whose judgment debtor is the owner of property,
including present or future rights to property, which cannot readily be attached or levied on by ordinary legal process and is not exempt from attachment, execution, and every type of seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities, is
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the motion on the issue of excess value of his homestead and demanded a
jury trial. The trial court overruled the debtor's motion and, without the
aid of a jury, determined the excess value of the homestead and appointed
a receiver to sell the property. The debtor appealed, asserting that article
3827a is merely a procedural device to be used by creditors in collection of
their judgments and does not authorize a court to make factual determinations regarding excess value of homestead property. The debtor argued
further that he was entitled to a jury trial on the factual issue of excess
value. The court of appeals agreed, holding that article 3827a is a purely
procedural collection statute pertaining only to execution and not to the
substantive issue of the exempt status of homestead property. 146 In order
to secure a determination of excess value, a creditor must allege and prove
such value. 147 Further, since the debtor in Steenland had made a timely
demand for a jury trial on the fact issues relating to value, he was entitled
to a jury. 148 The new definition of the urban homestead by area rather
will cause cases like Steenland to occur with far less
than by value
49
frequency. 1
The San Antonio court of appeals considered the effect of renunciation
of homestead rights in property that the owner does not yet occupy in
Miles Homes v. Brubaker.150 In that case a husband and wife purchased

unimproved property on which they planted grass, installed a water system, and put in a gravel driveway. They then entered into a contract with
entitled to aid from a court of appropriate jurisdiction by injunction or otherwise in reaching the property to satisfy the judgment.
(b) The court may order the property of the judgment debtor referred to in
Subsection (a) of this section, together with all documents or records related to
the property, that is in or subject to the possession or control of the judgment
debtor to be turned over to any designated sheriff or constable for execution or
otherwise applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment. The court may enforce the order by proceedings for contempt or otherwise in case of refusal or
disobedience.
(c) The court may appoint a receiver of the property of the judgment
debtor referred to in Subsection (a) of this section, with the power and authority to take possession of and sell the nonexempt property and to pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment.
(d) These proceedings may be brought by the judgment creditor in the
same suit in which the judgment is rendered or in a new and independent suit.
146. 648 S.W.2d at 390.
147. Id. at 389; see also In re Shaw, No. 583-00094, slip op. at 6 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept.
22, 1983). In Steenland the court noted that art. 3827a, a newly enacted statute, had been
construed only once. 648 S.W.2d at 389 (citing Pace v. McEwen, 617 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ)). In Pace the court held that art. 3827a gave the
trial court jurisdiction to determine the exempt status of property alleged to be homestead.
617 S.W.2d at 819. The issue of excess nonexempt value of homestead property was not
present in that case.

148. 648 S.W.2d at 391. The court recognized that the right of trial by jury is a valuable
right that state courts should closely guard. Id.
149. An amendment to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3841 (Vernon 1966) will be nec-

essary, however, to define clearly a claimant's right to designate his urban homestead.
Under the old value definition of the urban homestead, a new valuation of the whole property has been said to be necessary when the area of the homestead was increased. See In re
Sandlin, No. 583-00056, slip op. at 4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1983).
150. 649 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
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a builder to construct a home on the premises. Prior to delivery of any
materials, the husband and wife signed and returned to the builder a deed
of trust, which contained a clause stating that the property was not their
homestead.' 5' When the couple stopped making payments on the contract,
the builder attempted to foreclose on the property. The husband and wife
brought suit to prevent foreclosure, claiming that the property was their
homestead and that the deed of trust was not a valid mortgage or encumbrance. The trial court granted the relief sought, relying on the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Kempner v. Comer.' 52 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the disclaimer in the deed of trust estopped the
couple from asserting a homestead right. 53 The court noted, however,
that the disclaimer would have been ineffective had the property been in
actual use and occupancy as a homestead at the time the plaintiffs executed the disclaimer. 54 The court failed to explain why the lien would not
have been enforceable even absent the disclaimer, if the contract was for
improvement of property claimed as homestead.
Legislation has long provided that the proceeds of sale of a homestead
are exempt for six months. 55 Thus if a debtor who has recently sold his
home files a petition in bankruptcy, he may claim the proceeds as exempt.156 But a bankruptcy court has concluded that if the debtor acquires
a new homestead, he cannot also claim proceeds on hand from the sale of
the former home as exempt.157 Another bankruptcy court held that personalty acquired in connection with
the negotiation of a valid lien on
58
homestead property is not exempt.
Homestead- Abandonment and Its Effects. In Rimmer v. McKinney 59 the
Fort Worth court of appeals concluded that a husband did not abandon
his homestead interest merely by moving out of the family home in anticipation of divorce.16 0 Exclusion from the premises by court order does not
15 1. The disclaimer clause stated:
[TIhe property hereinabove mentioned and conveyed to said party of the second part [the trustee] forms no part of any property by them [the owners]
owned, used, occupied or claimed as their homestead or as exempt from
forced sale under the laws of the State of Texas, and disclaim and renounce all
and every claim thereof.
Id. at 793.
152. 73 Tex. 196, 202-03, 11 S.W. 194, 195 (1889) (once owner executes disclaimer, issue
of intent to use as homestead a moot issue).
153. 649 S.W.2d at 793.
154. Id.; see also In re Parker, 27 Bankr. 932 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983) (recitations in
mortgages puporting to designate specific homestead ineffective when contrary to actual
conditions). For a liberal interpretation of designation by sporadic occupancy, see In re
Shaw, No. 583-00094, slip op. at 3-5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1983).
155. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3834 (Vernon 1966). The legislature enacted art.
3834 in 1897, codifying the rule in Hunter v. Wooldert, 55 Tex. 433, 436-37 (1881).

156.
157.
158.
1983).
159.
160.

In re Harlan, 32 Bankr. 91, 92 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983).
In re Cereghino, No. 583-00065, slip op. at 3-4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 20, 1983).
In re Cannon, Nos. 581-00115, 583-0030, slip op. at 2-5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 14,
649 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
Id. at 367.
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exclude continuation of a spouse's homestead interest, 161 and therefore his
mere voluntary removal while divorce proceedings are pending would not
do so. Following the divorce in Rimmer the former wife obtained a declaratory judgment against her former husband's judgment creditor that her
homestead was not affected by the creditor's abstract of judgment filed
before the husband moved out of the home. A further bar to such a creditor's immediate right to reach the husband's interest in the community
homestead lies in the rule of law that neither spouse can seek an involuntary partition of the community short of divorce. Because a spouse's creditor may not ordinarily obtain a remedy that his debtor could not achieve,
the creditor may not force partition of the community homestead to reach
62
the debtor spouse's interest therein.
The circumstances in Rimmer raise the issue whether a spouse may acquire an independent homestead pending divorce. The Texas Supreme
Court held in Renaldo v. Bank of San Antonio 163 that a divorced parent
may acquire a family homestead, with the result that each divorced parent
could then have a homestead even though at that time a single adult could
not acquire a homestead. It would seem to follow from Renaldo that an
undivorced parent could establish an independent homestead without
jeopardizing his spouse's quiet enjoyment of the prior family homestead,
64
although the nonoccupant's homestead claim might be lost. 1
In several bankruptcy cases 165 the issue of abandonment of the homestead was before the court.166 After a careful weighing of the facts in each
case, the court must determine whether the claimant has abandoned an
established homestead. In such cases the burden of proof of abandonment
is upon the contestant.167 Hence those instances in which the creditor suc161. See Speer & Goodnight v. Sykes, 102 Tex. 451, 454, 119 S.W. 86, 87 (1909) (ex-wife
given sole occupancy of premises after divorce); Sakowitz Bros. v. McCord, 162 S.W.2d 437,
438-39 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1942, no writ) (husband temporarily enjoined from entering homestead property pending divorce).
162. The federal government, however, is capable of achieving this result as a creditor.
Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1972) (federal tax lien); see J. McKNIGHT & W. REPPY, TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW 198 n.2 (1983).
163. 630 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1982); see also In re Barnett, 33 Bankr. 70, 71 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1983) (rural family homestead for divorced father).
164. See In re Cumpton, 30 Bankr. 49 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
165. In bankruptcy the facts existing at the time the petition is filed control claims to
exemptions. In re Harlan, 32 Bankr. 91, 92 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983) (exempt quality of
roceeds of sale of homestead); In re Sandlin, No. 583-00050, slip op. at 3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
ept. 22, 1983) (designation of business homestead); In re Mack, No. 582-00057, slip op. at 4
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1983) (assertion of homestead in different property after court
awarded home originally claimed as exempt to bankrupt's wife in divorce proceeding pending prior to filing of bankruptcy petition).
166. In re Johnson, Nos. 583-0114, 583-0132 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1983); In re
Scarth, Nos. 282-00153, 283-0028 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 21, 1983); In re White, Nos. 58200060, 583-0070 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. May 16, 1983). In these cases the courts applied the rule
that if property is a homestead when it is mortgaged, the mortgage is void, but if the property is not a homestead at that time, the mortgage is valid. The homestead claimant is not
estopped by a misrepresentation that the property was not a homestead when it was purportedly mortgaged. In re Parker, 27 Bankr. 932, 934 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983).
167. Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex. 1971).
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In one recent case1 69 the creditor asserted that

the debtors' representation to the creditor that they then resided in New
Mexico constituted a fraudulent assertion that they had abandoned their
Texas homestead, but the court concluded that the creditor had not discharged the burden of showing fraud.' 70
In Zable v. Henry17 1 the Dallas court of appeals considered the validity
of an option to sell a homestead when the option was granted by the husband alone. In apparent anticipation of abandonment of the homestead or
a prior suit for damages for the husband's failure to convey the homestead,
the husband sought a declaratory judgment that the option was void because his wife had not joined in granting it. The husband conceded that
before the enactment of section 5.81 of the Family Code 172 any conveyance of homestead property by one spouse without the consent of the other
was not void but merely inoperative while the property continued to be a
homestead. 73 He argued, however, that section 5.81 changed the law by
specifically providing that one spouse may not sell, convey, or encumber a
homestead without the consent of the other spouse. 174 The court disagreed
with the husband's construction of the statute, holding that section 5.81 is
no more than a statutory enactment of the constitutional provision against
175
conveyance of homestead property without the joinder of both spouses.
The court thus refused to void the option and ruled that if the property
were no longer the homestead of either spouse when the option became
176
exercisable, the option would be enforceable by specific performance.
If, however, the property remained a homestead at that time, the purchaser
77
of the option would have an action for damages against the husband.
Homestead- Filing and Enforcing Liens. The exact nature of the home-

stead interest is uncertain under Texas homestead law.' 78 Some courts
168. One such case is In re White, Nos. 582-00060, 583-0070, slip op. at 4-5 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. May 16, 1983). The court's argument is not very convincing, however.
169. In re Scarth, Nos. 282-00153, 283-0023 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 21, 1983).
170. Id., slip op. at 7-8; see In re Reed, 12 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981), affTd, 700
F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983), discussed in McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wfe, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 97, 128 (1982), noted in Note, Use of the Texas Homestead
Exemption to ShelterAssets in Bankruptcy: First Texas Savings Association, Inc. v. Reed (In
re Reed), 14 TEX. TECH L. REV. 648 (1983).
171. 649 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
172. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81 (Vernon 1975).
173. See Grissom v. Anderson, 125 Tex. 26, 30, 79 S.W.2d 619, 621 (1935); Weinert v.
Cooper, 107 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1937, writ dism'd).
174. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81 (Vernon 1975) provides: "Whether the homestead is
the separate property of either spouse or community property, neither spouse may sell, convey, or encumber it without the joinder of the other spouse except as provided in Section
5.82, 5.83, 5.84, or 5.85 of this code or by other rules of law."
175. 649 S.W.2d at 139. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876, amended 1973) provides:
"The homestead of a family ... shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale. . . nor
may the owner or claimant of the property claimed as homestead, if married, sell or abandon the homestead without the consent of the other spouse ..
176. 649 S.W.2d at 138.
177. Id.
178. For an overview of Texas homestead law, see W. SIMPKINS, TEXAs FAMILY LAW
§ 36.4 (0. Speer 5th ed. 1977).
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have held that the homestead right is an estate in land, 179 while others
have considered it merely a privilege of exemption from creditors'
claims.' 8 0 In United States v. Rodgers' 8 l the United States Supreme Court
addressed this distinction and its relevance to an asserted federal tax lien
on Texas homestead property. In Rodgers the Internal Revenue Service
had assessed a tax deficiency against the defendant's husband. When the
husband then died without having paid the tax, the Service attempted to
foreclose the federal lien on his widow's homestead, which had been their
community property. 8 2 The Fifth Circuit Court held that the Service
could not foreclose a lien against the homestead of a spouse who owed no
tax liability if, under state law, the homestead is in the nature of an estate
in land rather than a mere exemption from creditors' claims. 183 The court
based this ruling on its view that the federal tax lien statute 8 4 allows attachment of a lien only against a delinquent taxpayer's interest in a jointly
held property and not against the entire property.' 8 5 The Fifth Circuit
Court concluded that because Texas considers the homestead a property
186
right in the nature of an estate in land, the lien could not be foreclosed.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the Texas homestead right is a vested property right. The Court stated that the homestead
laws grant rights that vest independently in each spouse regardless of
179. Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 590, 19 S.W. 35, 37 (1929); Orr v. Orr,
226 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, no writ).
180. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 318-19, 83 S.W.2d 620, 625 (1935); Foster v. Johnson, 89 Tex. 640, 646-47, 36 S.W. 67, 69 (1896). For an analysis of this line of cases, see
United States v. Rogers [sic], 649 F.2d 1117, 1126 n. 16 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2132,
76 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1983).
181. 103 S. Ct. 2132, 76 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1983).
182. The property was the defendant's home and had been community property during
the husband's lifetime. Id. at 2139, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 249.
183. United States v. Rogers [sic], 649 F.2d 1117, 1125-28 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.
Ct. 2132, 76 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1983).
184. The federal tax lien statute provides in part:
(a) Filing.-In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay
any tax, or to discharge any liability in respect thereof, whether or not levy has
been made, the Attorney General or his delegate, at the request of the Secretary, may direct a civil action to be filed in a district court of the United States
to enforce the lien of the United States under this title with respect to such tax
or liability or to subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or
in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or
liability.
(c) Adjudication and decree.-The court shall . . . proceed to adjudicate
all matters involved therein and finally determine the merits of all claims to
and liens upon the property, and, in all cases where a claim or interest of the
United States therein is established, may decree a sale of such property ...
and a distribution of the proceeds of such sale . . ..
I.R.C. § 7403 (1982).
185. 649 F.2d at 1127-28. Although its opinion is somewhat unclear, the court apparently reasoned that if the spouse had an actual property right in the homestead, the sale of
the entire homestead to satisfy the lien would constitute an unjustified taking of the spouse's
property that could not be adequately compensated.
186. Id. at 1126.
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whether one spouse or both own the fee interest in the homestead. 187 The
Court noted that Texas homestead laws effectively reduce the underlying
ownership rights in homestead property to an interest similar to a remainder and vest in each spouse an interest analogous to an undivided life estate. 188 Furthermore, this interest may be lost only by death or
abandonment, and it may not be compromised by the other spouse or his
or her heirs.' 8 9
Despite its conclusion that the Texas homestead right is an estate in land
rather than a mere exemption, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's holding and allowed the Service to foreclose the lien.' 90 The Court
rejected the construction of the federal lien statute as applying only to the
delinquent taxpayer's interest in jointly owned property. The Court held
that even if a delinquent taxpayer owns property jointly with another, the
statute permits the sale of the entire property to satisfy the judgment.' 9'
The Court also disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the
nontaxpayer-spouse's homestead interest is protected from a tax lien if it is
in the nature of a property interest. The Court noted that no such exception appears on the face of the statute and that to read one into the statute
would frustrate its policy. 192 Further, the Court stated that, under the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, the federal statute
must prevail over the state homestead law. 193 The fact that the Texas
homestead law creates an estate in land rather than merely an exemption
therefore will not prevent the federal government from forcing the sale of
an entire property, even if a nondelinquent spouse has a homestead interest in the property.
The Supreme Court further stated, however, that district courts should
exercise some discretion in ordering a sale of property under the tax lien
statute when a nondelinquent spouse has a homestead interest. 194 The
Court cited four factors that a district court should consider before ordering a sale: (1) the degree of prejudice to the federal government that the
sale of only a partial interest would cause; (2) whether the nondelinquent
spouse has a legally recognizable expectation that his or her interest will
not be subject to forced sale; (3) the prejudice to the spouse in terms of
undercompensation and dislocation costs; and (4) the relative character
187. 103 S. Ct. at 2138, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 248. In support of this proposition, the Supreme
Court cited TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50, 51, 52 (1876, as amended).
188. 103 S. Ct. at 2138-39, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 248.

189. Id. The Court, quoting the Texas Supreme Court, stated that the nonowner spouse
"has a vested estate in the land of which she cannot be divested during her life except by
abandonment or a voluntary conveyance in the manner prescribed by law." Id. (quoting
Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 585, 218 S.W.2d 428, 436 (1949)).

190. 103 S. Ct. at 2141, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 252-53.
191. Id. at 2141-45, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 253. The Court stated that the Fifth Circuit's construction of the statute was clearly contrary to its plain meaning and noted that the statute
allows the federal government to enforce its lien against any property in which the taxpayer
has any right, title, or interest. Id.
192. Id. at 2146, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 257-58.
193. Id. at 2147, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 258.
194. Id. at 2149, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 261.
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and value of the nonliable and liable interests in the property. 195 In making a partition of the property after the sale, the nonliable surviving spouse
is entitled to the full value of his or her interest including a right of future
occupancy.196 Hence, depending on the price realized at a forced sale, the
federal government's share could be less than half of such price.
In Estate of Johnson v. Commissioner 197 the Fifth Circuit court considered the nature of the Texas homestead in attributing the entire value of a
separate homestead to the estate of a deceased spouse for estate tax purposes. In large measure the court relied on its discovery of the Texas
Dower Act,' 98 which was passed in 1839 and repealed with the enactment
of the statutory definition of community property a year later, as controlling the nature of the homestead in this context. The court concluded that
homestead rights in favor of a surviving widow, which were statutorily
created in 1843, were in the nature of dower rights; hence the surviving
spouse's homestead interest was part of the deceased spouse's gross estate
for estate tax purposes. 199 Whether the 1843 act initially filled a conjectured "gap in the statutory scheme" 2°° resulting from repeal of the Dower
Act in 1840, as the court said, or whether it effectively replaced the
widow's right to a fourth part of the husband's estate under Spanish law,
which was also abolished on the same day in 1840, as the Texas Supreme
Court held in 1856,201 seems beside the point. What is relevant is the fact
that the Texas homestead has become an estate in land that has no relation
to common law dower. Somehow the court in Johnson lost sight of the
development of the law since 1843.
Texas courts have generally acknowledged that in a suit for divorce a
lien may be placed upon a spouse's homestead in order to secure the payment of a money judgment awarded to the other spouse for his or her
homestead interest. 20 2 Such a lien is permissible because it amounts to one
for purchase money. The homestead is not subject to imposition of other
valid liens, except liens for improvements and taxes attributable to the
195. Id. at 2151-52, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 263-64.
196. Id. at 2148, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 260.
197. 718 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1983).

198. Law of Jan. 26, 1839, 1839 Tex. Gen. Laws 149, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 149
(1898), repealedby Act of Feb. 5, 1840, 1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 172, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 346 (1898). Concerning the irrelevant and fleeting Dower Act, see McKnight, Texas
Community Property Law-Its Course of Development and Reform, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 117,
120 n.22 (1971). See also McKnight, Book Review, 46 TEX. L. REV. 297, 298 n.9 (1967).
199. 718 F.2d at 1312.
200. Id. at 1314.
201. Green v. Crow, 17 Tex. 180, 184 (1856).
202. Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst
Dist.] 1981, no writ); Davis v. Davis, 108 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1937, no
writ). In Rimmer v. McKinney, 649 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ), a
creditor of a valid lienholder on a homestead attempted to enforce the judgment lien. The
lien arose pursuant to a decree of divorce, and the decree contained no bar to such enforcement. The court severed the question of enforceability for a separate trial. Id. at 367. The
court also left unanswered the issue of whether one spouse's transfer of an interest in a
homestead to the other on divorce might constitute a fraudulent conveyance as to the transferor's creditors. Id. For a more complete discussion of Rimmer, see supra notes 159-62 and
accompanying text.
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premises. 20 3 In Letleri v. Lettieri20 4 the husband argued that the trial
court had placed an excessive lien on the homestead property. The trial
court had awarded the husband the homestead and other property and had
granted the wife a money judgment for her interest in those properties,
with a lien on the property it awarded to the husband. Thus the amount of
the lien on all the properties exceeded the value of the wife's interest in the
homestead. The court of appeals affirmed this judgment. 20 5 The court
noted that the trial court should have limited the lien on the homestead to
the value of the wife's interest therein, 206 but as the court of appeals
pointed out, the husband7 failed to obtain a finding as to the value of the
20
community homestead.
In McGoodwin v. McGoodwin 208 a husband attempted to avoid compensating his wife for her one-half interest in homestead property, which she
had conveyed to him upon their divorce. At the time of the divorce, the
trial court had awarded the husband the homestead and ordered him to
pay the wife a specific sum for her one-half interest. The court, however,
did not expressly impress a lien upon the property to secure payment of the
judgment. The husband later remarried, claimed the property as a homestead, and refused to pay the judgment. The wife sued to enforce the judgment, arguing that it afforded her an equitable lien on the realty superior
to the husband's claimed homestead right. The court of appeals agreed,
holding that an equitable lien in favor of the wife could be inferred from
the language of the divorce decree. 20 9 The decree had ordered the husband to execute all instruments necessary to comply with the judgment,
and the appellate court concluded that this language required the husband
to execute a deed of trust. 2 10 The court stated that a deed of trust is calculated to effect a purchase money lien, which is superior to a homestead
interest. 21' The court indicated, however, that had the decree not contained such comprehensive language concerning the instruments to be executed, the court would not have found that an equitable lien had been
2 12
impressed upon the property.
A Houston court of appeals discussed the requirements necessary for the
203. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 623 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ
dism'd); Day v. Day, 610 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
McKnight, supra note 170, at 125-26.
204. 654 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd).
205. Id. at 559.
206. Id.; accord Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 623 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Tex. App.-Waco 1981,
writ dism'd); Brunell v. Brunell, 494 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no
writ).
207. 654 S.W.2d at 559.
208. 656 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ granted).
209. Id. at 204.
210. Id.
211. Id. The Texas Constitution provides that liens and deeds of trust for purchase
money are superior to the owner's homestead interest. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876,
amended 1973).
212. 656 S.W.2d at 204. The court cited Spence v. Spence, 455 S.W.2d 365, 368-69 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Goldberg v. Goldberg, 425
S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no writ). These cases involved essen-
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creation of a purchase money lien on homestead property in Lifemark
Corp. v. Merritt.2 13 There the husband's employer had transferred him
from Houston to El Paso. To assist the couple in making the move, the
employer made them a loan secured by a deed of trust on their Houston
home. The couple then sold the Houston property and moved to El Paso,
where they used a portion of the loan proceeds to purchase a new home.
The employer later sued to recover the loan and demanded that the couple
turn over the El Paso property in satisfaction of the judgment. The employer claimed a purchase money lien on the property, because of the fact
that the couple had used part of the loan to purchase the new home. The
trial court refused to order a turnover of the property, and the court of
appeals affirmed. 214 The appellate court noted that the homestead exemption is not an effective bar to the foreclosure of a properly affixed purchase
money lien. 2 15 In order to create a valid purchase money lien on a home-

stead, however, a lender must record an agreement in writing securing
payment of the loan with the homestead property. 2 16 The mere fact that
the couple used part of the loan money to purchase a new home was insufficient to create a purchase money lien on the home. 21 7
In Stewart v. American Industrial Linings, Inc. 2 18 a house had been a
debtor's homestead for several years when creditors abstracted judgments
that would have reached nonhomestead property. In connection with selling the property, the debtor sued to clear his title of the purported liens.
The trial court denied relief, holding that neither the owner nor the purchaser had standing to sue because the creditors had never attempted to
enforce their liens. The court of appeals reversed, holding that because the
owner had established the homestead exemption as a matter of law, the
purchaser had standing to assert that the judgment liens had not attached
to the property before he purchased it. 2 19 The court thus ruled that the
property was free of any cloud cast by the abstracted judgments. 220
tially the same facts as McGoodwin, but the decrees did not order the execution of all neces-

sary instruments. The courts in these cases refused to find equitable liens.
213. 655 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
214. Id. at 316-18.
215. Id. at 318. TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 50 (1876, amended 1973) provides: "The home-

stead of a family or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby protected from forced
sale, for the payment of all debts except for the purchase money thereof .... "
216. Further, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(a) (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified
at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3835 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)) states: "A homestead
. . . of a family or a single adult . . . are exempt from attachment, execution, and forced
sale for the payment of debts, except for encumbrances properly fixed on the property."
217. 655 S.W.2d at 318. For a dictum on the construction of the subcontractor's lienretainage statute, TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5467 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (now
codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.053 (Vernon Pam. 1983)), see James Mechanical
Contractors, Inc. v. Tate, 647 S.W.2d 347, 349-50 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
218. 640 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
219. Id. at 656. In holding that the purchaser had standing, the court declined to follow
the holding in Mauro v. Lavlies, 386 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1964, no writ).
In Mauro the court held that homeowners who sued to remove judgment liens had established no justiciable controversy and thus had no standing to sue when the creditors had not
attempted to enforce their liens against the homestead. 386 S.W.2d at 826-27.
220. 640 S.W.2d at 656.
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Exempt Personalty. The Homestead Act of 1973221 allowed exemptions for
only two types of vehicle. The 1979 act 222 expanded article 3836 to allow
exemptions for more vehicles, provided they are not used for business purposes. 223 Additional vehicles may also be exempt tools of trade. 224 Although in some circumstances more than two firearms might be exempt as
tools of trade, the mere fact that a rifle has sentimental value to its owner
as a gift from his mother does not qualify it for exemption as an "heirloom. '225 Nor does equipment in inventory constitute tools of trade for
exemption purposes. 226 Although it is usually to the bankrupt's advantage
to claim state exemptions rather than federal ones, 227 federal income retirement funds are exempt only if the debtor chooses federal
228
exemptions.
In In re .4len229 a bankruptcy court in Texas felt compelled to reiterate
restrictive interpretations of Bankruptcy Code section 522(f)230 as applied
to nonpossessory, non-purchase-money liens on tools of trade of Texas
bankrupts, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed that construction. 23' The same
bankruptcy court has, nonetheless, construed another part of the same section so as to interpret congressional intent perhaps too liberally in favor of
232
the bankrupt.

IV.

DIVISION ON DIVORCE

Dividing All the Property. The trial court has wide latitude under Family
Code section 3.63(a) 233 to divide property on divorce in a manner that is
just and right. The trial court's division of the property will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. 234 If, how221. Ch. 588, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1627, amended by Act of Mar. 19, 1979, ch. 302,
art. 5, § 2, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 680, 688 (codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7150.3
(Vernon Supp. 1984)).
222. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. ar. 3836(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (now codified at
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001-.002 (Vernon Pam. 1983)).
223. Id; see In re Shaw, No. 583-00094, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1983).
224. See In re Sandlin, No. 583-00056, slip op. at 7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1983).
225. Id.
226. In re Cereghino, No. 583-00065, slip op. at 2-3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 20, 1983).
227. A bankrupt cannot claim both state and federal exemptions. In re Goff, 706 F.2d
574, 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
228. Id. at 579-80.
229. Nos. 582-00222, 583-0060, slip op. at 3-5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. May 9, 1983).
230. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (Supp. 1982), construed in In re Evans, 25 Bankr. 105, 109-10
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983); In re McManus, 681 F.2d 353, 355-57 (5th Cir. 1982), discussed in

McKnight, supra note 72, at 88-89.
231. 725 F.2d 290, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1984). Relying on Inre McManus, 681 F.2d 353 (5th
Cir. 1982), which dealt with Louisiana law, the Fifth Circuit reached the conclusion that
Texas bankrupts who claim state exemptions cannot avail themselves of the power provided
in § 522(0 to avoid non-purchase-money liens on exempt personalty. 725 F.2d at 292. The
court's conclusion is based on a very strained and peculiar construction of § 522(0.
232. In re Metzig, 33 Bankr. 620, 621-22 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983) (construing 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(0 (1982)).
233. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
234. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981); McKnight v. McKnight, 543
S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1976); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 659 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1983, no writ); Allen v. Allen, 646 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
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ever, the trial court fails to divide some of a couple's community property,
the appellate court must remand the case so that the division can be completed. 235 The trial court cannot merely reserve certain community from
consideration. "The [trial] court must decree a division of the property of
the parties when the jurisdiction of the court is invoked in a divorce action
by the pleadings of either spouse. ' 236 Further, if a court makes a division
of property and then grants a partial new trial with respect to items of
property not previously disposed of, the former order cannot constitute the
final division. 237 Hence, if community property was acquired prior to the
latter order, it must be considered in rendering the court's ultimate
division.
In exercising its discretion the trial court may consider a number of factors, including the fault of either party. 238 In Vautrain v. Vautrain 239 the
Fort Worth court of appeals concluded that the trial court had not erred in
its refusal to hear certain evidence of fault, because considering fault in
making a division is discretionary.2 40 The court did not suggest, however,
that the trial court might refuse to hear any evidence with respect to the
reason that the parties, or one of them, sought a divorce. 2 4' Although the
trial court need not hear interminable evidence of fault after the general
conduct of the parties has been established, it would be error to hold that
the court need not hear any evidence of fault, because the surrounding
circumstances might be relevant to the property division.
If as a result of a party's fraud the trial court does not have all the community property before it, the opposing party may be able to use a bill of
review to achieve a reconsideration of the division. 242 The bill of review is
an appropriate mechanism, however, only if the fraud was extrinsic rather
than intrinsic; review is appropriate if the party seeking review can show
"some deception, collateral to the issues in the formal trial, practiced by
the adverse party, which prevent[ed] the applicant from fully presenting
his claim or defense in the former action. '24 3 Thus in Jones v. Jones244 the
former husband succeeded in his bill of review when, through no fault of
1982, no writ); Kopecinski v. Kopecinski, 627 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus
Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
235. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 643 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no
writ) (citing Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376, 331 S.W.2d 299, 302 (1960)); Whitehill v.
Whitehill, 628 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
236. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 643 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ
(citing Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376, 331 S.W.2d 299, 302 (1960)).
237. Glud v. Glud, 641 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
238. See Murffv. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981).
239. 646 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd).
240. Id. at 312.
241. See Harrington v. Harrington, 451 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1970, no writ). The Harrington court held that even if fault is not alleged as a ground for
divorce, the court should be advised of the "cause of the parties' inability to live together as
husband and wife, or the conduct that contributed to the divorce." Id. at 800.
242. Jones v. Jones, 641 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
243. Id. (citing Nelson, The Requirement of Extrinsic Fraud,30 BAYLOR L. REV. 539, 540
(1978)).
244. 641 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
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his own, he was completely unaware of a $35,000 savings account that his
24 5
former wife concealed at the time of divorce.
In Morrison v. Rathmell 246 the Tyler court of appeals reversed the trial
court's summary judgment against a former wife who brought a bill of
review concerning property division. 24 7 The petitioner had alleged that
her former husband had grossly undervalued his two businesses in negotiations for a property settlement and that he had forced her into the agreement by threatening to abandon the businesses and render them worthless
if she persisted in her attempts to have the businesses appraised. The court
concluded that the pleadings raised a genuine issue of material fact, which
precluded summary judgment. 248 It would seem, however, that if those
allegations were true, the court should have denied the bill of review because the fraud was intrinsic to the settlement negotiations.
Edwards v. Edwards249 raised the issue of extrinsic fraud in a somewhat
different context. The couple in Edwards went together to an attorney,
who filed a petition for divorce, and the husband executed a waiver of
service of citation. The couple then reached an agreement concerning the
division of their property and the care and support of their children. The
parties later made an attempt at reconciliation and resumed cohabitation,
but the suit for divorce was not dismissed. After efforts at reconciliation
had failed, the couple again discussed getting a divorce. The husband understood that the hearing would take place on July 13, but the wife's attorney procured an ex parte hearing on July 12. The court granted the
divorce at the hearing, and on the basis of the wife's testimony the court
modified the agreement concerning conservatorship. Upon discovering
these events the husband filed a motion for a new trial and a date was set
for a hearing. Both parties and their attorneys appeared at the hearing,
but the parties agreed to attempt reconciliation again or else submit a new
agreement to the court. Although no reconciliation was reached, for reasons not stated in the opinion a new agreement was not submitted to the
court and the motion for new trial was dismissed. The husband appealed
on the basis of the wife's extrinsic fraud. The Fort Worth court of appeals
vacated the judgment, stating:
The actions of the wife in attempting the reconciliation and resumption of cohabitation and thereafter going to court without notice to
husband, and seeking a unilateral modification of their agreement,
constituted extrinsic fraud. As this occurred subsequent to the original agreement and the executing of the waiver ultimately relied upon
to obtain the divorce, the husband was entitled to notice of any hearing. To require no further notice would be unfair to the party who
had previously given a waiver and violative of basic due process no245. Id. at 345 (citing Comment, Bill ofReview. The Requirement of Extrinsic Fraud, 30
BAYLOR L. REV. 538, 540 (1978)).

246. 650 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ dism'd).
247. Id. at 151.
248. Id.

249. 651 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
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tice requirements. 2 0
Another court held that a nonparticipating party like the husband in Ed25
wards may also proceed by writ of error. '
Some attorneys have serious strategic reservations about joining a cause
of action for an interspousal tort with a suit for divorce, because they fear
either that the property will be divided in such a way that it takes the
tortious injury into consideration or that the tort recovery, if substantial,
will jeopardize a more generous property division in the client's favor. In
Ulrich v. Ulrich25 2 both the trial court and the appellate court refused a
remittitur on the tort recovery, thus rejecting the tortfeasor spouse's arguments that the damages were excessive. 253
Property Not Subject to Division. While the Texas Supreme Court was
dealing with the characterization of the increased value of separate
255
stock 254 and the appropriate disposition of federal retirement benefits

accrued during marriage, the lower appellate courts were applying these
and related rules of characterization to the process of division of assets on
divorce. Almost simultaneously, moreover, the Supreme Court of Texas
and the legislature both concluded that property a spouse acquires while
domiciled in another state is properly divisible on divorce as community
property if it would have been community property had a Texas domiciliary acquired it.256 This principle has since been reflected in only one appellate opinion. 257 The new rule concerning the community's right to
reimbursement with respect to appreciation in value of separately owned
stock in a close corporation has not had time to have any impact on decisions in the courts of appeal, but those courts have considered other business related aspects of characterization. In Martin v. Martin25 8 the Fort
Worth court of appeals reviewed a case in which community business
property was so ill-defined that it was impossible to determine whether the
250. Id. at 943. The court relied on Rylee v. McMorrough, 616 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd), a bill of review case.
251. Stubbs v. Stubbs, 654 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
252. 652 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
253. Id. at 506-07.
254. Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1983), discussed supra at notes 71-78 and
accompanying text.
255. Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 242, 78 L. Ed.
2d 232 (1983), discussed supra at notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
256. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982), discussed in Note, Cameron v.
Cameron: Divestitureof SeparatePropertyon Divorce, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 168 (1983), Comment, Community Property-Division of Property Upon Divorce-PropertyAcquired During
Marriagein a Common Law State Except By Gift, Devise or Descent Should Be TreatedAs
Community Property, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 789 (1983); TAX FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1984); see Reppy, "Quasi-Community Property" Comes to Texas, 9 COMM.
PROP. J. 171 (1982); Stewart & Orsinger, Fitting a Round Peg into a Square Hole. Section
3.63, Texas Family Code and the Marriagethat Crosses State Lines, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 477
(1982); Comment, The Division of Marital Property Upon Divorce and Quasi-Community
Property in Texas- The Texas Legislature Amends Section 3.63 of the Family Code, 23 S.
TEX. L.J. 139 (1982).

257. Heisterberg v. Standridge, 656 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
258. 628 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
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trial court had dealt properly with the community assets and liabilities. It
was necessary to remand the case for a more careful attention to the process of division. 259 In Mundy v. Mundy, 260 on the other hand, although a
community partnership interest had been properly divided, the court observed that the spouse who was not a party to the partnership agreement
did not by virtue of the divorce decree become a partner under the Texas
Partnership Act. 26' In a nonbusiness association context the San Antonio

court of appeals held that the trial court erred in divesting the husband of

a country club membership and awarding it to the wife. 262 The club was a

voluntary association organized as a nonprofit corporation. Membership
was by invitation only, and the husband alone had been granted membership. According to the club's bylaws, even the spouse of a deceased member required approval in order to become a member. The membership,
therefore, was personal to the husband, and the trial court had no authority to divest him of it.263
In Bybee v. Bybee 264 the court dealt with a dispute as to proportional
ownership of land and its division on divorce. Prior to their marriage the
couple had purchased the land for $28,000, with a cash down payment of
$2000 and a note executed by the future husband, who paid $800 of the
down payment. The woman he was about to marry paid $200, which the
husband later asserted was a loan. A third person paid the remaining half
of the down payment, and the husband subsequently recognized this interest by conveying an undivided one-half interest to that third person. In
to
addition, during the marriage the husband made a soothing statement 265
hers."
was
half
my
of
half
half,
my
of
part
the
owned
"she
his wife that
On the basis of this single remark, the trial court concluded that the wife
owned an undivided one-fourth of the property and divided the marital
estate accordingly. The court of appeals reversed this erroneous conclusion and remanded the case because "the overall division of the parties'
property" was obviously thereby disturbed. 266 Under the inception of title
doctrine, the wife's interest could not have been more than 1/140 of the
entire property, and it would not even be that large if the future wife's
contribution to the down payment was merely a loan.
In contrast to the remand in Bybee for redivision of the property, the
Dallas appellate court in Mundy v. Mundy267 held that mischaracterization

of a community asset as separate property is not a ground for reversal
unless the appellant shows that the mistake was reasonably calculated to
259. Id. at 536.

260. 653 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
261. Id. at 958 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 27(1) (Vernon 1970)).
262. Cluck v. Cluck, 647 S.W.2d 338, 344 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ dism'd).
263. Id. at 342 (citing Cline v. Insurance Exch., 140 Tex. 175, 166 S.W.2d 677 (1942);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Price, 108 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1937,
writ dism'd)).
264. 644 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
265. Id. at 221.
266. Id. at 222.
267. 653 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

cause, and probably did cause, an inappropriate division. 268 The court
stated that "an appellate court is not authorized to reverse merely because
the record discloses some error that is reasonably calculated to cause a
miscarriage of justice" unless the appellant goes on to show that an unfair
division was made. 269 Because the trial court, however, and not the appellate court should make the proper division, 270 it is unclear how the appellate court could conclude that the trial court would not have ruled
otherwise without putting the issue back before the trial court on remand.
If the trial court mischaracterizes separate property of one spouse as the
separate property of the other spouse or as community property and
awards it to the other spouse, the award constitutes reversible error because it divests a spouse's separate property. A spouse has the burden of
proving that property on hand at the termination of a marriage is his separate property, and if he discharges that burden, he obviously cannot later
argue that the property was community. These mischaracterizations are
not typical, however. Two forms of erroneous mischaracterizations are
common: mischaracterization of community property as separate property
and so awarding it, and mistakenly finding that separate property is community property but still awarding it to its owner. In both these instances
the recipient will assert that, but for the error, he might have received a
larger share of the community as well as all of his separate property. The
mischaracterization in Mundy and that in Reid v. Reid 27 1 were both of the
former type, findings that community property was the separate property
of one of the spouses and awarding it accordingly. The appellants in both
cases asserted that these mischaracterizations caused an improper division
of the marital property as a whole, and a clear error occurred in both instances. In such a case, if the error could not be more than trifling in light
of the sums and values involved, the appellate court would be justified in
dispensing with the time and expense of remand. But if the error exceeded
the bounds of the de minimis rule,272 the appellate court should order a
remand so that the trial court can exercise its proper function in making
273
the division.
FederalRetirement Benefits. In McCarty v. McCarty 274 the United States
268. Id. at 957.
269. Id. (construing TEX. R. Civ. P. 434). The record failed to reveal the value of the
property divided, and so no comparison between the spouses' respective shares was possible.
270. McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863, 866-67 (Tex. 1976).
271. 658 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
272. See King v. King, 661 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1983, no
writ). In Baker v. Baker, 624 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no
writ), the issue was incorrect valuation rather than mischaracterization. The appellate court
apparently followed the de minimis standard in its affirmance of a division that might have
been only slightly affected by the revaluation of a single item of personalty, which the trial
court valued on the basis of evidence improperly admitted.
273. 661 S.W.2d at 255-56.
274. 453 U.S. 210, 236 (1981), discussed in Note, McCarty v. McCarty: The Battle Over
Military Nondisability Retirement Benefits, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 335 (1982), Note, Military
Retirement Pay Not Subject to Division as a Community Property Upon Divorce: McCarty v.
McCarty, 19 Hous. L. REV. 591 (1982), Note, Federal Law Preempts State Treatment of
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Supreme Court held that military, nondisability, retirement benefits could
not be divided on divorce pursuant to state community property law. Thus
many former husbands saw the opportunity to suspend payment to their
former wives of retirement benefits awarded as community property under
divorce decrees entered prior to the McCarty decision.275 A multitude of
cases concerning the effect of McCarty on prior judgments followed.
These cases took various forms. With the exception of Ex parte
Buckhanan276 and ExparteAcree, 277 both of which allowed collateral attacks on pre-McCarty final decrees by way of habeas corpus proceedings,
the intermediate Texas appellate courts have consistently applied the doctrine of res judicata in dealing with such cases. 278 The Texas Supreme
Court laid the issue to rest in Segrest v. Segrest.279 Following the Fifth
Circuit holdings in Erspan v. Badgett 280 and Wilson v. Wilson,281 in Segrest
the court held that the McCarty decision had no retroactive effect on final
unappealed divorce decrees that had treated military nondisability retirement benefits as community property. 282 The court stated that since such
decrees were merely erroneous and not void, the rule of res judicata was
applicable.
Cases in which no final judgment had been entered at the time McCarty
was decided have given the courts greater difficulty. The difficulty arises
not only from McCarty but also from the enactment in 1982 of the UniMilitary Retirement Benefits as Community Property: McCarty v. McCarty, 13 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 212 (1982); see Raggio & Raggio, McCarty v. McCarty: The Moving Target of Federal
Pre-Emtion Threatening All Non-Employee Spouses, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 505 (1982); see also
Reppy, Community Property in the U.S. Supreme Court-Why Such a Hostile Reception?, 10
COMM. PROP. J. 93 (1983).
275. Kuhn, McCarty revisited-its repercussions continue to echo, 16 TRIAL L.F., Apr.June 1982, at 11.
276. 626 S.W.2d 65, 66-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
277. 623 S.W.2d 810, 811-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
278. See Exparte Deckard, 656 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ);
Hall v. Hall, 650 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, no writ); Thompson v.
Thompson, 646 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ); Nelson v.
Little, 644 S.W.2d 914, 914-15 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ); Kocian v. Kocian,
643 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ); Ex parte Rodriguez, 636
S.W.2d 844, 848-49 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ); Ex parte Hovermale, 636
S.W.2d 828, 835-37 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ); Ex parte Forderhase, 635
S.W.2d 198, 199-200 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ); Exparte Welch, 633 S.W.2d 691,
692-93 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ).
279. 649 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 242, 78 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1983); for a
discussion of the Segrest decision, see supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
280. 647 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982).
281. 667 F.2d 497, 499 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982). In In re Smith, 549
F. Supp. 761 (W.D. Tex. 1982), a federal district court denied jurisdiction of a dispute in
which the ex-husband sought removal of contempt proceedings to the federal court on the
ground that a question of federal law was involved. Id. at 764-65. The court added that
federal courts have no original jurisdiction in divorce cases and it is not appropriate for a
federal court to become involved in the enforcement of such decrees. See also Powers v.
South Central United Food Workers Welfare Trust, 719 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1983) (the fact
that a claim involves a federal statute does not necessarily mean that the cause of action
arose under federal law for purposes of removal to federal court).
282. 649 S.W.2d at 612-13.
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formed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act (USFSPA) 28 3 on September 9, 1982. Moreover, Trahan v. Trahan,284 decided by the Texas
Supreme Court in November 1981, contributed to the confusion. In Trahan, a suit to partition retirement benefits that a pre-McCarty decree had
not dealt with, the court held that no final judgment precluded application
of the McCarty rule because the original decree was on appeal at the time
McCarty was decided. 285 The court ignored the effect of the divorce decree that had left the property undivided. In Trahan the former wife of the
pensioner thus was denied partition of the military retirement benefits.
After the decision in Trahan and in direct response to McCarty, Congress passed the USFSPA, effective February 1, 1983. Under this act state
courts are authorized to divide military, nondisability, retirement benefits
on divorce in accordance with state law on the subject. 286 These provisions apply to funds payable at any time after June 25, 1981, the day
before McCarty was decided. 287 Congress thus apparently intended that
the McCarty decision have no effect in subsequent cases, although the language of the act is far from clear. The USFSPA therefore seems to allow
Texas divorce courts to resume pre-McCarty treatment of military retirement benefits as community property. In cases that had not been fully
adjudicated prior to McCarty, however, or were heard after McCarty but
before enactment of the USFSPA, the courts apparently had no choice but
to follow McCarty. In re Grant2 88 was such a case. In Grant the trial court
had awarded the wife a portion of her husband's military retirement benefits prior to the decision in McCarty, but the decree was on appeal at the
time McCarty was decided. Since the judgment was not final, the
Amarillo court of civil appeals reversed and remanded with instructions
that McCarty be followed and the community be divided without regard to
289
the husband's military retirement benefits.
2
9
0
Cameron v. Cameron was tried before McCary but was not decided
by the Texas Supreme Court until October 13, 1982, after the enactment
but before the effective date of the USFSPA. The trial court in Cameron
had awarded the nonpensioner-spouse a percentage of her husband's retirement pay beginning at the date of its decree in March 1979. Since the
USFSPA was effective only after June 25, 1981, the Texas Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court but excluded the portion of the
award covering the period from the date of the decree through June 25,
283. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1401a (1982).
284. 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981), discussed in Note, Trahan v. Trahan: FederalPreemption ofTexas Community Property Law, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 483 (1982); see McKnight, supra note
170, at 144-45.

285. 626 S.W.2d at 488.
286. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(I) (1982); see Newton & Trail, Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act-A Legislative Answer to the McCarty Problem, 46 TEX. B.J. 291,
307 (1983); Reppy, Reconsidering the Rulesfor Military Benefits, 5 FAM. ADVOC., Spring

1983, at 30.
287. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982).
288. 638 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).

289. Id. at 255.
290. 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982); see McKnight, supra note 72, at 97-99.
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court thus treated the benefits in the same way as it had
in Trahan for periods prior to the effective date of the
recognized that the Act supersedes McCarty for the period
1981. If Congress meant that McCarty should have no effect
court in Cameron partially missed the mark because it gave

McCarty effect through June 25, 1981.292

Several recent cases illustrate the proposition that the Trahan decision
cannot stand after Cameron. McGehee v. Epley,293 Boniface v. Bonface ,294
and Heisterberg v. Standridge 295 involved divorces granted before a 1978
change of federal law 296 that clarified the character of civil service retirement benefits. 297 In each of these cases the plaintiff sought a partition of
undivided benefits after the 1978 act. The courts in all three cases interpreted the act broadly to define the undivided civil service benefits as community property at the time of divorce and hence as resulting tenancies in
common. 298 A federal district court reached essentially the same result in
Sutherland v. Sutherland,299 where it was asserted that federal law preempted state community property law in its treatment of Fleet Reserve
retainer pay as separate property. The couple in Sutherland had been divorced in 1971 and the court divided the husband's retainer pay at that
time. Under the doctrine of res judicata the court held that the final decree
was not subject to review. 3°° Nevertheless, in a decision handed down
after the enactment of the USFSPA, the San Antonio court of appeals misguidedly followed Trahan in holding that military retirement benefits, undivided in a pre-McCarty divorce, could not be partitioned in a post-Act
proceeding. 30 1 In light of the decisions in Cameron and Segrest, however,
it is clear that Trahan is no longer authoritative as to final decisions ren291. 641 S.W.2d at 223.
292. Cf. Voronin v. Voronin, 662 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ dism'd)
(community entitled to pre-June 26, 1981, nondisability retirement benefits).
293. 655 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), aftd in part and rey'd in part, 661
S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tex. 1983).
294. 656 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
295. 656 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
296. A 1980 amendment to 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (1976) allowed payments to be made directly
to the spouse to whom they were awarded. 5 U.S.C. § 83460)(1) (1982).
297. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); see McKnight, supra note 86, at 11518; see also Boniface v. Boniface, 656 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ). On the
mechanics of enforcement, see McDannell v. Office of Personnel Management, 716 F.2d
1063 (5th Cir. 1983).
298. 656 S.W.2d at 135.
299. 563 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
300. Id. at 444-46. It is to be hoped that the matter is now put to rest. See Sutherland v.
Sutherland, 560 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (declaratory
judgment writ not available when husband failed to perfect appeal); Ex parte Sutherland,
526 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1975) (trial court determination not subject to collateral attack by writ
of habeas corpus); Exparte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974,
writ dism'd) (habeas corpus attack refused); see also Richard v. Richard, 659 S.W.2d 746
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ) (federal preemption governs Social Security disability
payments).
301. Salmans v. Salmans, 643 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1982, no writ).
For another misplaced allusion to Trahan, see Moore v. Jones, 640 S.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
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dered prior to McCarty. Nor can post-McCarty divorce decrees rendered
after enactment of the USFSPA be affected by Trahan.
In Gordon v. Gordon 30 2 the Corpus Christi court of appeals recognized
the confusion created in the period after McCarty but before enactment of
the USFSPA in considering an appeal from an order granting a divorce
during that period. Military retirement benefits were involved but were
not expressly provided for in the final decree. Showing a degree of frustration, the court stated:
Normally, where a divorce decree fails to provide for the division of
community property, the husband and wife become tenants in common. . . thereof. However, we feel that the perplexing and unusual
circumstances created by the retroactive effect of [the USFSPA] rejudgment and remand the cause to the trial
quire that we reverse 30the
3
court for a new trial.
The court observed that the trial judge's failure to consider retirement benefits was not error because the law in effect on the date of the divorce
the
precluded doing so. Nevertheless, the court apparently concluded that
3°4
had.
ever
McCarty
effect
any
nullified
had
USFSPA
the
of
passage
After the passage of the federal act the El Paso court of appeals considered Madrid v. Madrid,30 5 in which the trial had also occurred after McCarty and before passage of the federal act. The husband appealed on the
ground that the trial court had not properly applied McCarty in dividing
the community estate. The appellate court observed that while it was error
for the trial court to have considered the retirement benefits at the time of
trial, upon remand the court should not only consider the benefits but also
3°6
divide them as community property.
Attorney's Fees. It has long been recognized that a Texas trial judge may
award attorney's fees to one party or the other in making an equitable
division of the property on divorce. 30 7 The San Antonio court of appeals
in Cluck v. Cluck 30 8 reaffirmed the rule that in order to overturn the trial
court's judgment in this regard it must appear that a clear abuse of discretion occurred. 30 9 A major point of contention in Cluck was a fee the trial
court awarded the wife's prior attorney, who had withdrawn before trial
and appeared at trial only to testify as to the reasonableness of his fee. The
court found that the attorney had done work in preparation of the case and
was entitled to recover his fee in the divorce proceeding rather than having
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
S.W.2d
S.W.2d
308.
309.

659 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
Id. at 478.
Id.
643 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
Id. at 187.
Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950); Baker v. Baker, 624
796, 799 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Lipshy v. Lipshy, 525
222, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ dism'd).
647 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ dism'd).
Id. at 340.
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to file a separate suit.3 10
In Beavers v. Beavers31' the Dallas court of appeals affirmed a trial
court's order granting a former wife's motion for an increase of a supersedeas bond to secure annual payments due her as part of a property division
on divorce. 3 12 The trial court had also declared that the movant would be
entitled to recover attorney's fees should subsequent litigation become necessary to enforce the payments. The appellate court observed that this declaration did not make the trial court's judgment interlocutory, because it
did not relate to the issues the trial court decided and was therefore only
incidental to the judgment. 31 3 Although the court of appeals thus did not
rule on the propriety of the trial court's statement concerning attorney's
fees, such an award was then questionable. Article 2226 permits recovery
of attorney's fees in suits founded on oral or written contracts.3 1 4 There is
authority for the proposition that when a written property settlement
agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree and a subsequent suit to
enforce the contract is filed, attorney's fees are available. 31 5 The divorce
decree in Beavers, however, involved no underying contract, and the filing
of a separate suit would have been necessary to enforce the award. Without statutory authority for an award of attorney's fees in subsequent litigation, the trial court in Beavers may have overstepped its jurisdictional
bounds in then making such a prospective award.
Post-Divorce Disputes. Some post-divorce disputes stem from poorly
drafted orders, others result from unwillingness to comply with orders, and
still others arise beyond the terms of the divorce courts' decrees. To foresee all possible disputes would strain the prescience of a Hebrew prophet,
and to ensure enforceability by contempt would thus tax the talents of the
very best draftsman. 316 In 1983 the legislature established new provisions
governing clarification and enforcement of orders. 31 7 The recent legislation will be helpful to some extent, but it does not purport to deal with
310. Id.,"see also Bass v. Bryan, 609 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980,
no writ) (award of fees to discharged attorneys). In a separate, post-divorce suit by an attorney whose services were terminated prior to divorce, liability rests on principles of contract
law. Werlein v. Bishop, No. 1173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 1975, no
writ) (unreported); see also Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 624 S.W.2d 800, 801-02 (Tex. App.Houston [ 14th Dist.] 198 1, no writ) (severance of claim of dismissed attorney under TEX. R.
Civ. P. 174(b)).
311. 651 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
312. Id. at 54-55.
313. Id. at 54.
314. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1984). But see TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.77 (Vernon Supp. 1984), discussed in text accompanying note 343 infra.
315. Brophy v. Brophy, 599 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
This case was decided before the supreme court held in Exparte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841,
844 (Tex. 1979), that such incorporation caused the contract to merge into the decree. Cf.
Robertson v. Robertson, 608 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ) (at-

torney's fees denied in suit by nonparty beneficiaries under terms of a judgment).
316. For some very useful suggestions, see Matheny, Enforceabilityof Judgments andProposed Specifc Clausesfor Use in Family Law Cases, 45 TEX. B.J. 435 (1982).
317. Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 424, §2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2346, 2350-53 (codified at
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.70-.77 (Vernon Supp. 1984)); see Sampson & Hazelwood, 1983
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problems that the decree does not anticipate or that may not be enforced
by use of the court's contempt powers. Thus the courts may still resort to
established means of construing or enforcing ineptly worded decrees as to
which the new statute is silent.
Clerical errors in a judgment may be corrected in a judgment nunc pro
tunc, but judicial errors cannot be so corrected. 31 8 The distinction between
the two types of error is not always easy to define, however. In Davis v.
Davis3 19 the appellate court determined from the record that the divorce
court meant to award the wife all of the lots on which the family home was
located; hence an omission to list one of the lots was properly cured by a
corrected judgment. 320 In In re Beavers32 1 the husband resorted to the
normal route of appeal, asserting that the trial court, which had approved
the parties' agreement, had failed to conform its judgment to the agree322
ment. The appellate court ordered that the judgment be reformed.
Similar clarification was achieved by way of appeal in Baker v. Baker.323
In Belz v. Bez 3 24 the Dallas court of appeals noted an exception to the
general rule that the trial court loses jurisdiction over a case thirty days
after the judgment becomes final and may not thereafter change the judgment. 325 If the exception applies to divorce cases in which the trial court
has the power to render a spousal support order even after an appeal from
326
the divorce judgment has been fully perfected to the court of appeals,
the enforcement of such an order seems to come within the Texas Supreme
Court's recent holding in Ex parte Bonlface 327 announced three weeks
later. The supreme court held in Boniface that the trial court in a divorce
proceeding lacks jurisdiction to conduct a contempt proceeding during the
pendency of an appeal. 328 The tenor of the supreme court's opinion in
Bonface also casts doubt on the efficacy of the trial court's ordering temLegislation Affecting Family Law Practice-the 681h Session, ST. B. SEC. REP., FAM. L.,

Summer 1983, at 8-10; see also infra notes 334-43 and accompanying text.
318. TEX. R. CIv. P. 316.
319. Davis v. Davis, 647 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
320. Id. at 783-85.
321. 648 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
322. Id. at 733-34.
323. 624 S.W.2d 796, 799-800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). In ac-

cordance with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 12.04(9), 14.02(a) (Vernon 1975), but apparently
not in accordance with the record, the judgment in Baker provided that the mother, as managing conservator, should have "the rights to inherit from and through the child." 624
S.W.2d at 800. The father asserted that this term of the decree amounted to deprivation of
some of his rights of paternity. The appellate court struck out the offending language in
order to avoid further friction between the parents. Id. The court's decision should not be
understood as a construction of the referenced Family Code provisions. Those provisions
permit one parent to be deprived of rights of inheritance from his minor child, along with
any other rights stemming from the inheritance rights. The deprivation is not intended to
extend beyond the child's minority and does not affect the child's right to make a will. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 12.04(9), 14.02(a) (Vernon 1975).
324. 638 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
325. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d).
326. 638 S.W.2d at 159.
327. 650 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1983).
328. Id. at 778.
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porary alimony after perfection of an appeal without an instruction from
the appellate court to do so.
The Texas Supreme Court's decision in McGehee v. Epley 329 did not
cause the enactment of the clarification and enforcement amendment to
the Family Code, 330 but it dramatized the need to which those amendments responded. A divorce decree awarded the wife in McGehee one half
of the husband's military retirement benefits, but it contained no order
directing the husband to pay the benefits to the wife and was thus unenforceable by contempt. 33 1 Ten years after the divorce the wife went to
another court seeking clarification of the decree. That court granted an
order clarifying amount, time, and manner of making payments. The San
Antonio court of appeals held that this order was merely a clarification
and not a change of the judgment.3 32 In a per curiam opinion the supreme
court held that the order constituted a change that the original trial court
its judgment and, hence, a different trial court was
could not have made in 333
also powerless to do so.
The clarification-of-judgment amendments to the Family Code went
into effect September 1, 1983. 334 Among other things these amendments
define the procedure for enforcement of property divisions pursuant to divorce decrees and delineate the trial court's power to enforce its judgments. Under section 3.70 the court retains jurisdiction for a period of two
years to enforce a property division upon filing of a motion to enforce. 335
In unequivocal language, however, section 3.71 states that under the new
provisions the court may not amend, modify, alter, or change the division
of the property as set forth in the divorce decree. 336 Previously, a court
could not use its contempt powers to enforce an order to divide property
unless the order set out with precision the actions necessary for compliance
with the order. Now, in cases in which the order is not specific enough to
be enforceable by contempt, the court may, on its own motion or that of
either party, issue a clarifying order under section 3.72, setting forth spe337
cific terms to enforce compliance with the original division of property.
Section 3.73 of the new statute empowers the court to order delivery of
property that is held by one spouse at the time of the divorce but awarded
329. 661 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1983).
330. Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 424, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350-53; see supra notes 31617.
331. See, e.g., Exparte Harris, 649 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no

writ) (decree failing to order parties' compliance not enforceable by contempt); Ex parte
Smiley, 626 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ) (details in decree must
be in clear, specific, unambiguous terms to be enforceable by contempt).
332. McGehee v. Epley, 655 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 661 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1983).

333. 661 S.W.2d at 926.
334. Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 424, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2346, 2350-53 (codified at
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.70-.77 (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
335. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.70 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
336. Id.§371.
337. Id. § 3.72.
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to the other spouse in the decree. 338 If the party in possession of such property loses or destroys it, the court can substitute a money judgment for the
undelivered property under section 3.74.339 Similarly, when one party
fails to pay money owed to the other party, the balance due can be reduced
34 °
to judgment.
Section 3.75 addresses situations involving installment payments or
other payments to become due in the future. 34 1 The time limits for jurisdiction imposed by section 3.70 therefore do not apply to these situations,
and such payments can be enforced by contempt when they become due.
Section 3.76 sets forth circumstances under which contempt is an appropriate enforcement procedure and specifically identifies situations in which
contempt proceedings are not available. 342 For example, contempt is unavailable to enforce a money judgment rendered in lieu of an award of
specific property. Finally, section 3.77 allows an award of costs and rea34 3
sonable attorney's fees in suits to enforce a property division.
The new clarification of judgments act should eliminate problems such
as those presented by Ex parte Powell.344 In Powell the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals granted a writ of habeas corpus to an ex-husband who
was jailed under an order of contempt until he paid $28,000 into the register of the divorce court. The trial court had called upon the ex-husband to
account for proceeds from property he had sold pursuant to a divorce decree. He first stated he did not know what had happened to the money but
later admitted giving it to another. The trial court therefore, found him in
contempt. The appeals court found that holding the ex-husband in contempt and confining him to jail until the money was paid was an attempt
to secure payment of a debt arising from the divorce decree. Hence the
court held that the order was void as imprisonment for debt under the
Texas Constitution. 345 The court also stated that although punishing the
contemnor for lying to the court was proper, punishing him for nondelivery of funds was inappropriate. 346 The court apparently was confused
concerning the difference between criminal and civil contempt. Such confusion is perhaps understandable in the light of the fact that the court is
almost always concerned with punishment rather than compulsion. But
the court overlooked a distinction that the Texas Supreme Court has implicitly drawn between an order to pay a debt 347 and an order to perform
an act, for example, to sell property and deliver the proceeds to the court
338. Id. § 3.73.
339. Id. § 3.74.
340. Id.

341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. § 3.75.
Id. § 3.76.
Id. § 3.77.
Expare Powell, 641 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).

345. Id. at 542 (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18); see also Expare Thomas, 610 S.W.2d
213, 214-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).

346. 641 S.W.2d at 542.
347. Exparte Yates, 387 S.W.2d 377, 378-80 (Tex. 1965).
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or to a party. 348
349
The post-divorce dispute at issue in Employers Casualty Co. v. LaFave
originated in a 1980 divorce decree that awarded a community automobile, which was registered in the husband's name, to the wife. In 1981 the
ex-husband renewed the insurance policy on the car, and he was named in
the policy as the insured owner. The wife subsequently reimbursed her
former husband for the premiums he had paid, and she assumed that she
had insurance coverage. In the ex-wife's subsequent suit against the insurer for benefits under the policy, the insurer pled the terms of the policy,
which required that any driver have the permission of user from the
named insured. Since the car was the plaintiffs property, the ex-husband
had no control over its use and had no authority to grant or deny permission for its use. The court therefore concluded that at the time of the accident from which the suit arose the car was being driven without
and insurance coverage was not available
permission of the named insured
350
under the husband's policy.
As part of a settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree
in Hudspeth v. Stoker,35 1 the husband agreed to continue making payments on his employer's group life insurance policy. The policy had a face
value of $15,000 and was payable to the wife as trustee for the couple's
children. The ex-husband's employer subsequently changed insurers, so
that the policy existing at the time of the divorce was cancelled. The exhusband named his second wife as beneficiary under the new policy, which
had a face value of $20,000. When the ex-husband died, a dispute arose
between his first and second wives. The San Antonio court of appeals
stated that the change of insurance carriers was not significant 3 52 and that
by the terms of the divorce decree the husband had in effect surrendered
his right to change beneficiaries under the policy up to the face amount of
the original policy.353 The court therefore affirmed the trial court's imposi-

tion of a constructive trust upon $15,000 in favor of the children and
awarded the remaining proceeds to the second wife.
Effects of Bankruptcy on PropertyDivision. Without any significant discussion of the point, a federal district court in Moses v. Moses 354 sustained a
bankruptcy court's conclusion that a contractual undertaking, incorporated in a divorce decree, to make support payments to an ex-wife is not
348. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. 1979); Ex parte Sutherland, 526
S.W.2d 536, 639 (Tex. 1975); Exparte Preston, 162 Tex. 379, 383-84, 347 S.W.2d 938, 940

(1961).
349. 651 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, no writ).
350. Id. at 862. For a similar case involving a fire insurance policy, see Duren v. U.S.

Fire Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 32, 36-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ), commented on in
McKnight, Family Law. Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 115,
153 (1980).
351. 644 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
352. Id. at 95.
353. Id. at 96.
354. 34 Bankr. 378 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
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dischargeable in the ex-husband's bankruptcy. 355 In light of the statement
in Family Code section 3.631(C) 356 that a divorce court can incorporate
such agreements in the decree and thereby cause them to be merged in the
judgment, 357 the court's conclusion seems proper. But money judgments
or orders to make installment payments that do not arise from agreed settlements still raise the question of dischargeability in bankruptcy. 358 Although the Fifth Circuit court seems to view all such orders as in the
nature of "alimony substitutes ' 359 and thus nondischargeable in bankruptcy, 360 other federal circuits are not in full agreement with this conclusion.36 1 Thus the matter is ripe for consideration by the United States
Supreme Court.

355. Id. at 378-79.
356. TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN.

§ 3.631(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984).

357. See Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1979) (agreement merged into

judgment).
358. See II U.S.C. § 523 (1982). The section discussed exceptions to the discharging of

debts under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1328(b) (1982).
359. In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1975).
360. Id. at 1027.
361. See, e.g., In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1107-11 (6th Cir. 1983) (assumption of joint
debts); Stout v.Prussel, 691 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1982) (Small Business Administration
loan); cf.In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Comer, 27 Bankr. 1018,
10 19-22 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Tucker, The Treatment of Spousal and Support Obligations
Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 45 TEX. B.J. 1359 (1982). Further, the
entire issue of 5 FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1983, is devoted to the subject of bankruptcy and
divorce. Concerning the possibility of invoking TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3827a
(Vernon Supp. 1984) (providing post-judgment relief for creditors), see generally Hittner,
Texas Post-Judgment and Receivership Statutes, 45 TEX. B.J. 417 (1982); Comment, New
Tools for the Creditor, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 341 (1983).

